

THE
CONGREGATIONAL REVIEW,

VOL. XI. — JULY, 1871. — No. 60.

ARTICLE I.

THE NEW DEPARTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.*

In that most telling hit of the literary season in England, "The Fight at Dame Europa's School," such a picture is given of the sordid neutrality of England, when other powers are involved in war, as would have been unpardonably offensive if done by any other than an English hand. The author — a clergyman of the Established Church — does not hesitate to represent the Dame as calling John Bull "a sloven and a screw." "You are content to sacrifice everything — duty, and influence, and honor — for the sake of putting by a few paltry shillings." When humanity and peace and his own position

* THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON; *Signed by the respective Plenipotentiaries*, and sealed at Washington, the 8th day of May, 1871. (Ratified in Senate May 24th.)

LETTERS BY HISTORICUS, *on Some Questions of International Law*. Reprinted from the (London) *Times*, with additions. London and Cambridge. 1863. Pp. 212.

A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT *of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War*. By Mountague Bernard, M.A., Chicheleian Prof. of International Law and Diplomacy. Oxon and London. 1870. Pp. 511.

THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, No. CCXXIX., Oct., 1870, Art. I.: *British Neutrality During the Civil War*. By Pres. T. D. Woolsey. Pp. 31.

THE ALABAMA CLAIMS; *Two Lectures to the Senior Class, at Yale, May, 1869*. By the same. Reported in the *College Courant*.

call for action, to prevent war and bloodshed,—“Sit still and grind away, old chap,” says his financial fag, “and make some more money.” The public sentiment of Europe upbraids him through the Dame’s lips: “You sit coolly in your shop, *supplying the means of carrying on the fight*, and coining a few wretched coppers out of your school-fellows’ blows and wounds.” “And just look here,” cries out William, (of Prussia,) “do you know where these cuts on my forehead came from? Why, from stones which you pitched across the water, for Louis (of France) to throw at me.”

“Can’t help it, Bill,” replies John, “it is the law of neutrality!”

“Neutrality, indeed! I call it brutality.”

All this is quite as severe as anything we said of the very peculiar style of neutrality to which England treated us during the Rebellion, and equally as just. *Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*. “When I went to settle in the place where I now live,” said Rev. Dr. Quint, of New Bedford, in the Boston Council, (1865,) “I found that my people’s property, being upon the sea, had been given to the flames by British pirates,—vessels of war, built in England, manned, and supplied there. But when I was in the service of my country, and saw my comrades dead, when I saw friends from Wisconsin, Indiana, and New York, dead, side by side, I knew that they fell by British bullets, from British muskets, loaded with British powder, fired by men wearing British shoes and British clothing, and backed up by British sympathy.” Dr. Robert Vaughan, on his return to England, characterized this just and accurate language, in his Review, as a “burst of spleen,” and put on record the statement that, “A pastor of position in the denomination, who had taken a conspicuous part in the Council, assured (him) that he did not think there were three men in the Assembly who did not deplore the exhibition which his brother Quint had made of himself.” (Brit. Quar. Review, October, 1865, “Notes on the U. S. since the War, by the Editor,” pp. 443-446.) Six years have passed. An English clergyman turns the honest indignation of his countrymen

upon the neutrality with which England has disgusted and angered Christendom. The first sentence of a new treaty between the great Anglo-Saxon Powers, contains these words of acknowledgment — extraordinary words, in such a document — “Whereas, Her Britannic Majesty has authorized her high commissioners and plenipotentiaries to express, in a friendly spirit, the regret felt by Her Majesty’s government, for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the Alabama, and other vessels, from British ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels.” This acknowledgment is the basis of the action of arbitrators to be appointed, and of the treaty itself, implying some lack of neutral duty on the part of England; perhaps worse, some “laches,” at least, as lawyers would say. The author of “The Fight” says — worse:

“Each of the upper boys, at Dame Europa’s, had a little garden of his own in the corner of the play-ground. . . . John’s garden was pretty enough, and more productive than any; owing its chief beauty, however, to the fact that it was an island, &c. But his arbor was a mere tool-house, where he shut himself up almost all play-time, turning at his lathe, or making nets, or *cutting out boats to sail on the river.*”

Mr. Nast, our American John Leech, points the hit with an illustration, in his edition, (one of the best of his thirty-three, all of merit,) representing John at his bench, cutting out an Alabama, with a sign over his head, “THE NEUTRAL SHOP,” and a smaller one at the corner, “*Privateers for Sale.*” Dr. Quint is quite harmless, compared with the author and the illustrator of the English *brochure*. He did but call attention to the cuts on Brother Jonathan’s forehead, from stones which John had pitched across the ocean for a squad of mutineers against Jonathan to throw at him.

The Treaty of Washington has settled the long-mooted question of John Bull’s responsibility for the mischief accruing from the sea-going craft and the warlike missiles he has made so many “wretched coppers” by furnishing, to the injury of those with whom he professed to be at peace. He has been found guilty of “supplying the means of carrying on the fight,” and is to be mulcted accordingly. It is ten years since

the Southern Rebellion broke out. It is nine years the 29th of this present month (July) since the "290," afterwards called the *Alabama*, but then known only by the number she bore in the ship-yard of the Lairds, her builders, sailed from Liverpool. In all these years England has been denying her responsibility. She has denied it on the ground of the established principles of international law. This has been the position taken by Members of the Government, Members of Parliament, publicists, orators, editors, British correspondents of American journals, review and magazine writers, private gentlemen at home and traveling in this country, — in short, by everybody who has intelligently spoken or written on the English side. If they have been right and we have been wrong, and it is the intent of the treaty to alter neutral duties and belligerent rights, or if we have been right and they wrong, and the treaty substantially recognizes this, in either case it is a new and important departure in international law.

The author of the first of the able English works named above is well known to be Mr. W. Vernon Harcourt, the new M. P. for the city of Oxford, colleague of the Rt. Hon. Edward Cardwell, M. P., (Mr. Gladstone's War Secretary,) and a Liberal. The letters here collected and enlarged attracted great attention when originally published in the "Times," and made the author a Member of Parliament. Mr. Harcourt, under the pseudonym of "Historicus," ventures to "unhesitatingly assert that the trade, in contraband, with either belligerent, by private persons of the neutral state, within the neutral territory, is a lawful trade; that it is not the duty of a neutral Government to prohibit such a trade within its own territory, and that the belligerent State can have no ground of complaint against the neutral Government in respect to such a trade." What is meant by "contraband of war," is sufficiently clear, viz.: arms and implements for warlike purposes, ships, ship-timber, naval stores, ship-building materials, horses, even provisions in certain cases, and any other articles, before innocent, which have become necessary for warlike purposes. Whatever vagueness may have rested on the earlier definitions,

—those of Grotius, Vattel, Bynkershœck, and others,—no one would *now* deny that the Alabama, her stores, armament, crew, clothing, all obtained in England, and nowhere else, come within the meaning at present recognized. Grotius divides “contraband of war” into two classes: “those things which are useful only for the purposes of war, and those which are susceptible of indiscriminate use in war and in peace.” (*Wheaton. Law of Nations*, p. 509, ed. 1846.) A third class of articles, not of use in war, neutrals are permitted to convey or sell to the enemy. The second class includes money, provisions, ships and naval stores. The tendency of treaties and treatises has been to define more precisely what trade with a belligerent is prohibited to a neutral Government or people, and what is not, guarding with care and accuracy the supposed rights both of neutrals and belligerents. Between a hostile expedition fitted out and sailing from a neutral port with the consent of the neutral Power, express or implied, to prey upon a friendly Power, and articles of trade, even ships and armaments, purchased of private citizens belonging to the neutral nation, but intended in like manner for hostile purposes, it has been attempted, indeed, to set up a broad and recognized distinction. The author of the second of the English works named below—Oxford Professor of International Law—without denying that the Alabama and her outfit, taken separately, fall into the class of contraband articles, endeavors to disprove the responsibility of England for supplying them to Southern rebels, on the ground that *unless combined* they did not constitute a hostile naval expedition, and they were not so combined within the territorial limits of England. He says: (p. 392.)

“To constitute an expedition by sea, these things are necessary :

“A ship or ships capable of being used for war.

“An armament, greater or less.

“A present intention that the ship and armament shall be used for war.

“Till these are combined, there can be no such thing as a hostile expedition; uncombined, they are the materials or separate elements of an expedition.”

Prof. Bernard admits the existence of every one of these elements in the case of the Alabama. He admits the injury done by this and other British-built and furnished ships, to the United States; but he strives to cover England with the two defenses of fraudulent methods pursued by the Confederates in obtaining British aid for warlike purposes, and the non-combination of the materials obtained while within British jurisdiction. He says (pp. 437, 438):

"The various contrivances by which these vessels were procured and sent to sea, were discreditable to the Confederate Government, and offensive and injurious to Great Britain. Such enterprises were, and were known to be, calculated to embroil this country with the United States; they were carried into effect by artifices which must be accounted unworthy of any body of persons calling themselves a government — of any community making pretensions to the rank of an independent people. Every transaction was veiled in secrecy, and masked under a fictitious purchase or a false destination. By such devices it was intended, no doubt, to escape the notice of a vigilant and powerful enemy; but it was also intended to blind the eyes of the government of Great Britain. Nor will any one attempt to dispute that the success of these projects was extremely annoying and irritating to the American Government and people. It is true, as they have constantly repeated, that the ships were procured in England; it is true that they were armed in England; it is true that of the crews which manned them, a large proportion were British subjects; it is true, also, that they severely harassed American shipping, and inflicted heavy losses on American trade. All this is true; what is not true, I think, is that for these losses the British nation is justly responsible."

The defenses sought to be set up are vain, and England is by the Treaty held responsible. An "unarmed ship," as the Alabama has been incessantly in this discussion said to have been, when she left Liverpool, and an unshipped armament, issuing from such a port as freight in another vessel, is each, separately, contraband of war, and liable to seizure *in transitu* to its destination, or point of combination, on good grounds; and not only this, but more — they are together *such* contraband articles that the neutral nation from which they issued is liable for all the depredations committed by them when "combined. Prof. Bernard says, that "vessels not armed for war, and not carrying arms as cargo," is "a description which

includes every ship that left this country during the war for the Confederate service." And vessels of that description, with that destination, which "harassed American shipping, and inflicted heavy losses on American trade," under the Treaty it will be found were "hostile expeditions," for which "the British nation is justly responsible." There is no pretense that they belonged to a Confederate navy — no such thing existed.

The letters of "Historicus" give pertinent and ample quotations from recognized authorities in support of the position, that by the law of nations neutral trade in articles contraband of war with either or both belligerents has been heretofore allowed to any extent. "In neutral territory it is absolutely lawful."* The authorities are Ortolan, Bynkershoek, Lam-predi, Azuni, Wheaton, Kent, Story, Huskisson, Canning, the American State Papers, U. S. Reports, etc., etc.† This

* Insurances on contraband voyages are valid insurances, capable of being enforced at law." p. 142.

He asserts that the Foreign Enlistment Act does not in any wise "interfere with commercial adventure" or "control the absolute freedom of neutral commerce." It is directed "not against the *animus vendendi*, but the *animus belligerendi*." (So Bynkershoek.) "A subject of the Crown may sell a ship of war, as he may sell a musket, to either belligerent with impunity; nay, he may even despatch it for sale to the belligerent port. * * * The purview of the Act is to prohibit a breach of allegiance on the part of the subject against his own Sovereign not to prevent transactions in contraband with the belligerent." Pp. 168, 169. "To equip and arm a vessel of war within the United Kingdom is not *per se* an offense against the statute; it is the equipping and arming *with intent to commit hostilities* against a foreign government which constitutes the misdemeanor. The Act is directed not against the 'cauponantes bellum,' (supplying for the sake of gain? Cf. Dame Europa!) "but against the 'belligerantes.' The mere sale or equipment for sale is in itself no evidence of such an intent, which must be proved conclusively on some better grounds." P. 169. "The equipping and arming of a ship may, or may not, be evidence of such an intent." Canning and Huskisson, and 7 Wheaton Reports — case of the Santissima Trinidad — are cited in evidence. This is averred to be "both law and common sense, which are not so seldom coupled together as ignorant persons are apt to suppose." P. 171. All this means intent to carry on war on the part of the builder, equipper, seller of the ship. A most convenient distribution of responsibility for the technical evasion of consequences, — the party of the first part, as a bond or deed would say, supplying the means of carrying on the fight," — and the party of the second part supplying the intent. As they are not combined in the same "party," no offense was committed! Cf. Bernard, p. 398. The question is one of *particeps criminis* as to intent.

† Perhaps Pres. Woolsey's "Introduction to the Study of International Law," published three years before the volume of "Historicus," and ten

writer has no words too severe or contemptuous for the opposite opinion, as held by Galiani, Hautefeuille, and Dr. Phillimore. It is the "idle crotchet of Galiani,"—"unauthorized speculations," "presumptuous sciolism," "newfangled monstrosity";—of Hautefeuille he says, "for contempt of the existing code of international law; for intrepidity in the mis-

years before that of Prof. Bernard, was unknown to these writers. He distinguishes between *strict* and *imperfect* neutrality, the latter being *impartial* or *qualified*. Neutrality, he says, "is not an amicable act, when I supply two of my friends with the means of doing injury, provided I do as much for one as for the other. Such a relation is not that of a *medius inter hostes*, but of an *impartial enemy*, of a *jack on both sides*. Moreover, it is impartiality in form only, when I give to two parties rights within my territories which may be important for the one, and useless to the other." § 157. But he releases the "citizen or subject" from this strict rule, § 162, which binds the Sovereign. Cf. Bernard, 386, same doctrine. Aid to each party by neutral trade he pronounces not at all impartial, but "partial now to one side, and now to the other." It must be unjust, tending only to "put off or render fruitless the effort to obtain redress with which the war began." § 169, *a*. But he declares that nothing can be regarded as contraband "unless so regarded by the law of nations, or by express convention between certain parties." § 180. He rejects the doctrine of occasional contraband. On the whole, Dr. Woolsey's statements lean to the English position. He would "by no means affirm that it is the duty of the neutral nation to prevent such trade (contraband) on the part of individuals by vigilance and penalty." § 169, *a*.

In his second edition, (1869,) Dr. Woolsey adds this language to what he had before said on violation of neutrality: [it is a violation of neutrality for a neutral nation] "to suffer its subjects to prepare or aid in preparing or augmenting any hostile expedition against a friendly power, as, for instance, to build, arm, or man ships of war with such a purpose in view, or to build them with this intent so far, as to make them ready for an armament to be put on board upon the high seas or in some neutral port." "It ought, however, to be said that the base arts of merchants and ship-builders will often prevent governments from obtaining due evidence of the existence of such hostile designs; and that the distinction between what is merely contraband of war,—as a ship of war made for sale, *if that be a fair instance*,—and that which is a hostile expedition, is sometimes so nice, that the present law of nations, and municipal law enforcing it, must allow many wrongs done to neutrals to slip through their fingers." § 160. And in a note (to § 179,) he says: "Ships ready made and capable of use for purposes of war, have not occupied the attention of treaty-making powers." Huebner declares them contraband. So Heffter. Phillimore says "that the sale of a ship for purposes of war is the sale of the most noxious article of war. The sale by a neutral of *any* ship to a belligerent is a very suspicious act in the opinion of the English and North American prize courts, and one which the French prize courts refuse to recognize." He then quotes Hautefeuille on the other side, (with dissent,) as to a vessel yet unarmed,—an opinion which should mollify "Historicus" largely!—but, on the whole, himself sustains the English view still. What he says of improving the law of nations we notice further on. He asks in a new Note to § 178 if "vessels made ready for an armament" are not "the beginning of a hostile expedition?"

representation of history; for audacity of paradox," he is "without his equal, even in the modern license of coxcombical jurisprudence." And Dr. Phillimore's recent work he terms at one time, "an indiscriminate digest of opinions"; at another, "a heterogeneous pile of indiscriminate and undigested material." Such authors are "false lights," and "blind guides." He pours unmeasured contempt on the position of this eminent English jurist, that neutral trade in contraband should be prohibited because opposed to "the eternal principles of justice,"—"which, it should seem, on this subject," he says, "are hardly compatible with reason and common sense." He avers that if this doctrine were once to become international law,—

"It is easy to perceive the monstrous and intolerable consequences that would ensue. Instantly upon the declaration of war between two belligerents, not only the traffic by sea of all the rest of the neutral powers of the world would be exposed to the inconveniences of which they are already impatient, but the whole inland trade of every nation of the earth, which has hitherto been free, would be cast into the fetters. The neutral government being on this assumption [its duty to prohibit the domestic trade in contraband] held responsible to the belligerent for the trade of its subjects within its own territory, must establish in every counting-house a sort of belligerent excise. It must have an official spy behind every counter, in order that *no* contract may be concluded for which either belligerent may call it to account, and in respect of which it may possibly find itself involved in war. This new fangled and, forsooth, liberal doctrine would introduce the irksome claims of belligerent rights into the bosom of neutral soil, from which they have been hitherto absolutely excluded, and in which they ought to have nothing to do. It would give to the belligerent state a right of interference in *every* act of neutral domestic commerce (!) till at last the burden would be so enormous that neutrality itself would become more intolerable than war, and the result of this assumed reform, professing to be founded on 'the principles of eternal justice,' would be nothing less than universal and interminable hostilities."

Imagine the horror of this able and accomplished Englishman when he finds this assumed reform, this speculation, this crochet, this sciolism, this monstrosity, recognized by the High Commission as sound international law (as between his own country and the nation against whose claims his denunciations

of it were leveled, and in so far as such ships as the Alabama, etc., etc., are concerned), in the terms following :

" *Rules* — A neutral government is bound : First — To use due diligence to prevent the *fitting out*, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has *reasonable ground to believe* is intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to *prevent the departure* from its jurisdiction of a vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted *in whole or part* within such jurisdiction to warlike use.

" *Secondly*. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

" *Thirdly*. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and as to all persons within its jurisdiction to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

" * * * * * and the high contracting parties agree to observe these rules between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them."

Imagine the consternation of the Oxford M. P. at all this, if he still holds fast his elaborately argued and authoritatively supported opinion !

Prof. Bernard's book is, in name, a "History;" but is really an argument as well as a history. It is an argument upon the history and the history of an argument. So he avows in his introduction : " Primarily a contribution to the history of international law," it is, also, " a general view of the conduct of the British government in relation to the war." Chapter XIV., on " The Alabama Claims," is a labored defense and protest of forty pages against those claims. He insists that there is no remedy for the injuries we suffered but " mutual forbearance, candor, moderation, and self-control ;" that a proper allowance for injured American feeling can not " make unreasonable pretensions just ; and it does not warrant or excuse the revival, after five years of profound peace, of complaints and demands which were unjust when originally urged during the strife and fever of the war." Writing seven years after " *Historicus*," he does not cite the same text-writers, but

evidently has them in mind, and frames his statements of rightful neutral trade as they do ; and he takes pains to controvert in a note a later author, Signor Petro Esperson, Prof. Int. Law, Univ. Padua, who recently maintained that "England owes the full amount of the depredations caused by the Alabama, because, in effect, this vessel, although carrying a Confederate flag, was nothing but an English corsair." He gives the British and American positions all through, with comments intended to show that the former were always right and the latter always wrong. He states the general principles applicable to the case as follows :

"The law of nations as hitherto understood—or, if any one prefer the phrase, the understanding which has existed among nations—as to their relative rights and duties—does not prohibit a neutral from supplying to a belligerent ship, whether of commerce or of war, as it does not prohibit the supply of ship-guns and ammunition, without which ships are harmless. How a vessel so supplied was built—where she was built—by whom, for whom, or on what terms she was built ; how or on what terms she came into the possession of the belligerent—are questions which, as between nations, are irrelevant and immaterial. Nor is the neutral government required to satisfy itself that she shall be carried by the belligerent into one of his own ports, nor to make sure that she shall not be armed with guns exported from the neutral country for that purpose. In all these transactions the neutral country serves only as a place from which engines of war are procured by a belligerent who stands in need of them, and does not serve as a place in or from which the war itself is carried on.

"The law of nations does, on the other hand, declare that a country in or from which hostilities are suffered to be carried on, forfeits its right to the character of a neutral. It makes it, therefore, the duty of the neutral government to prevent, by the use of such means as governments may reasonably be expected to have at their command, the despatch of hostile expeditions from its shores. If at the time of its departure there be the means of doing any act of war—if those means, or any of them, have been procured and put together in the neutral port—and if there be the intention to use them (which may always be taken for granted when they are in the hands of the belligerent), the neutral port may be justly said to serve as a base or point of departure for a hostile expedition."

But all this he denies in the case of the Alabama and other ships. He denies that the intent of those furnishing vessels or armament was even constructively hostile ; that anything else than positive legal proof of their destination is to be con-

sidered; in reply to the position, that the neutrality laws of England are defective, that England has refused to cure known defects in them, and that to plead these defects as an excuse for not fulfilling international obligations, is a bad plea, he deems it pertinent to say that nations are not under obligation to have perfect laws! He cites the legal advice given the government against proceeding in the case of the Alabama, in its defense, while expressly admitting that "it was known to the British government, long before she sailed, that this vessel was apparently designed for war; and there was strong reason to suspect that she was intended for the Confederate service. Evidence on this latter point, that might have satisfied a jury, was in possession of the Commissioners of Customs at the earliest on the 22d of July, at the latest on the 23d;" and she did not sail till the 29th. This gentleman was in attendance upon the High Commission at Washington; we hope his future instructions at Oxford will be improved by the Treaty formed under his eye, which rules that any vessel which there is "*reasonable ground to believe* is intended to cruise or carry on war," is a hostile expedition; and holds the power which does not use "due diligence" (on "*reasonable ground*") to prevent her "fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction," responsible; and authorizes the arbitrators on the American claims to "assume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules," "at the time when the claims arose"! He sustains his government in repelling (in August, 1865,) the first proposition for an arbitration made through the Hon. Charles Francis Adams, American Minister at London, (in October, 1863,) "on the ground that there were but two questions which could be made the subject of a reference; first, whether the British Government had acted with due diligence; secondly, whether its legal advisers had correctly understood their own municipal law; and that neither of these could properly be submitted to a foreign arbiter, still less to a joint commission"; just such an arbitration as is now provided for (and by a joint commission) by which the first (if not both) of

these very questions must be considered. He quotes Jeff. Davis's assertion against us,—(going beyond even his proper object, to vindicate the conduct of Great Britain) — that “the Confederate Government purchased in Great Britain, a neutral country (and with strict observance both of the law of nations and the municipal law of Great Britain!) vessels which were subsequently armed and commissioned as vessels of war,” etc., his object being, at least, to throw doubt upon the commission of wrongs which the High Commission, the Treaty, and the arbitration all assume were committed. He mentions the opinion of the Law Officers, “that the Alabama was liable to seizure for a breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act, *though no arms had been put on board*,” and admits that it “appears more than possible that the report of the Law Officers might, with greater dispatch, have been obtained a day or two sooner than it actually was”; and yet pronounces the opinion that the Government was at fault and chargeable — which is the foundation for all the late and future proceedings — “rash and unreasonable.” He contends that the violation of neutrality can and must take place neither before nor after the time a ship leaves neutral waters, but precisely at the time (*punctum temporis*); which is putting so fine a point upon it, that such a violation could probably never be detected and punished, and is exactly what the Treaty does not require to be proven before arbitrators! He rejects even the reasonable and moderate ground of some writers, that “a ship built for war, fully armed for war, equipped and provisioned for sea, may be produced as an article of commerce, and either sold to a belligerent in a neutral port, or sent abroad to a belligerent port for sale, without any violation of neutrality, *provided* she were not built or equipped to order or in pursuance of an understanding with the belligerent purchaser”; and quotes the letter of the Lairds and the opinion of Mr. Mellish, to show that the furnishing of the Alabama was innocent, though such an “understanding” is as plain as day, and, this proven, a ship much less than “fully armed” would come within the rules of the Treaty. He denies that dispatching the ship and

her armament separately for the purpose of being combined are parts of the same transaction, and has the hardihood to say, that "proof that both ship and armament were obtained in England, and that they were respectively transported to France or Portugal in order to be put together, is proof of a fact which is *nothing at all to the purpose*." He attempts to controvert the last editor of Wheaton, "an able writer," who says that "the intent covers all cases, and furnishes the test. It must be immaterial where the combination is to take place, whether here or elsewhere, if the acts done in our territory — whether acts of building, fitting, arming, or of procuring materials for those acts — be done as part of a plan by which a vessel is to be sent out with intent that she shall be employed to cruise" * — an opinion whose soundness, as opposed to the sophistries of the "Chichele Professor at Oxford," both in reason and in law, the plain terms of the first Rule of the Treaty abundantly vindicate.

President Woolsey's article in the "North American Review" takes the English side, with some qualifications which we shall quote fairly, which seem inconsistent with the drift of the paper. He pronounces the essays of "Historicus" "timely and serviceable to the cause of order," especially where they treat of the "recognition of revolting provinces." Professor Bernard, he says, "has performed a service for which the students in his science will be grateful; he has gone over the whole field of claims and questions to which our civil war gave birth." "In Mr. Bernard's exposition of the Alabama claims we find nothing to complain of; we meet here the same candor and truthfulness which is obvious throughout the work." This is in respect to statements of fact; but Prof. Bernard's opinions also pass almost entirely unchallenged. A distinction or two is indeed taken: *e. g.*: between an offense against common law or the Foreign Enlistment Act, in the building such a ship, and a wrong done to a *neutral* thereby. But

* Wheaton, Edited by Hon. R. H. Dana, Jr., p. 563, *Note*, § For fullness of matter Bernard deserves all praise; especially for his large extracts from State papers.

Dr. Woolsey admits that this is no offense against international law. "The law of nations, as interpreted by our courts, requires no neutral to interfere for the prevention of a trade in contraband carried on by its citizens or subjects (Cf. *Introd. to Int. Law*. § 162), or to take active measures against a ship purposing to run a blockade instituted by a friendly State." Yet he implies, later, by a single question, that it "may be the *duty* of nations to *agree* that contraband trade shall be prohibited at the commencement of a voyage." But this is to go behind the law of nations as it is, to suggest what it ought to be, a ground on which Mr. Sumner's tread is heavier and will be heard longer than any of those whom either commercial interest, or the passions of the hour, or the imperfections of international law led to disagree with him. In one passage Dr. Woolsey *seems* to hold with Mr. Sumner—to whose great discourses, however, he makes no allusion—that States and statesmen are not compelled to confine themselves to existing international law in dealing with international injuries—which is the exact ground on which the Treaty of Washington stands—though the drift of his article opposes this view. "Either we on this side of the water are grievously in the wrong, or international injuries are wholly independent of State law; if there is no law" (municipal law is meant) "or an inefficient one, that is no plea against foreign claims; the *obligations* of nations are the main points in the case. Let it be made to appear that no *wrong known to the law of nations* is committed when a ship builder on neutral soil constructs a vessel of war, which is to be employed avowedly in destroying the commerce of a friendly State, or let it be made to appear that a contrivance which puts the threads of an armament together in foreign waters, when they were entirely spun in one and the same country, may be overlooked, and the United States can have no just claim for damages in the case of the Alabama. But in that case it may well be asked: Of what value are international laws of neutrality, if the neutral subjects can do what they will, and if war is fed and prolonged by their cupidity?" This is the nearest approach he makes to intimating that we

have any claims. Mr. Bernard's argument against them he "feels compelled to pass by in respectful silence." And although he does still suggest three points: (1) That the Alabama was built for the Confederates; (2) the Government orders to detain the vessel (made after the bird had flown!) admitted that there was *prima facie* evidence against her;* (3) Did the trick of the Confederates, in combining ship and armament in foreign waters, free the Government of Great Britain "from all responsibility?"—the third and last point is only a query, and it is not clear but it falls into confusion of thought, for "responsibility" *under the law of nations*, is one thing, and "responsibility" outside of and beyond and above that law, is quite another. Responsibility under the law he is logically confined to — excluding our claims. The words italicised in the passage quoted above also suggest the same confusion in their interpretation. For the "obligations of nations" cover more than "wrongs known to the law of nations." And Dr. Woolsey declines to claim anything from England, save what is covered by the recognized law of nations, while he expressly says, later, of the present practice under the laws: "Neutrals supply the food upon which war lives, and supply it alike to either belligerent that can pay for it, so that until exhaustion comes upon one of the combatants, the harvest of the neutral trader goes on." Every one who has written or spoken on this subject, has had his election to stand within the limits of the letter of the law, or — while recognizing these — to take higher ground, as Mr. Sumner and Mr. Dana and the Treaty have done. President Woolsey seems to have made the opposite choice.

In the second of Pres. Woolsey's lectures to his class, more than a year earlier, the report of which here cited is his own abstract, he seemed to go further, however. He gave the following statement of international law: "It is a violation of neutrality to open harbors for hostile enterprises, or to allow the presence of a person, or vessel, within the neutral's terri-

* Contra. Bernard, p. 400. Note. To detain her is denied to have been "international duty."

tory, when there is evidence that a hostile undertaking is being planned, or to allow the subjects to prepare or augment any hostile expedition. Thus, to build, arm or man ships of war, with this view, or to build them with this intent; so far as to make them ready for an armament, which is to be put on board on the sea, or in some neutral port, is an unneutral proceeding." But he urges, after all, only a *prima facie* claim, and this simply on the score of neglect, or want of ordinary vigilance on England's part,—"there was such hesitation, such unwillingness to act, such prolix counsel and advice, such fear to step an inch beyond the letter of the law," (*i. e.*, the law of the State,—not to step beyond the law of nations, he approves,) "when great interests were at stake, that one can not but regard the claim for damages as *prima facie* a very good one." Subsequently, he maintains that the excuse of room for fraud because the line between ships of war built for commerce and those made for a belligerent is so fine, is a bad one, because the usual papers were not required of the Alabama. But the ground of our "fair claims for damages" is still held to be the same, not wrong, but mere neglect, since "it can be set aside by showing that all possible care was taken to discover and prevent this hostile expedition." Room is made in the Treaty for this very ground (*in argument hereafter*) by the terms, "the escape, *under whatever circumstances*, of the Alabama." If that were all "Her Britannic Majesty" had to say to us, there would be no departure in the international law, such as the new "Rules" afterward embody. Nor would there be any certainty of any damages whatever.

There are several points involved in this great international settlement which we do not discuss, for lack of space. They may be opened hereafter. It is worth while to observe, however, in closing, that while the second and third "Rules" of the Treaty might have been promulgated without the first, this draws after it, logically, the other two. Even "Historians" discerned this. "If M. Hautefeuille," he says, "is right in saying that trade in contraband, within the neutral territory, carried on by neutral subjects, with one belligerent, affords to

the other belligerent a lawful cause of war, it is simply nonsense to pretend that it is not the duty of the neutral Government to prohibit such a trade." (P. 138, *note*.)

And it is worth while, also, to note that there have not been wanting suggestions, heretofore, of the very change which is now proposed in the law of nations—"hints toward reforms." The first, in point of time,—perhaps in point of dignity, also,—seems to have been American, and to have originated in the Congress of the United States. The first Foreign Enlistment Act, as old as 1794, revised in 1817–18, prohibited the preparation of any hostile expedition against friendly Powers, and the being concerned in fitting out any vessel to cruise or commit hostilities in foreign service, against any nation at peace with the United States, etc. The Act of 1817, when introduced, also prohibited the fitting out and arming "any private ship or vessel of war, *to sell the said vessel, or contract for the sale of said vessel, to be delivered in the United States, or elsewhere, to the purchaser,*" with the intent to cruise, etc. (Letter of George Bemis, Esq., of Boston, on "American Neutrality, its honorable Past and expedient Future;" quoted by Bernard, p. 404.) Dr. Woolsey italicises the statement that this provision was struck out by the Senate. But we can not be robbed of the historic honor of the proposition, made more than fifty years before the Treaty of Washington. The title of the Bill of 1817 was originally, "A Bill to prevent citizens of the United States from selling vessels of war to the citizens or subjects of any foreign Power, and more effectually to prevent the arming and equipping vessels of war in the ports of the United States, intended to be used against nations in amity with the United States." This title was, of course, changed when the provision above cited was omitted. The English Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. III., never contained any such provisions, nor did it contain any such as Secs. 10 and 11 of our Act of 1818, requiring armed vessels issuing from our ports to give bonds, and authorizing the detention of suspicious vessels by Collectors of the Customs. Galiani and Hautefeuille seem to have led the way among text-writers, in

advocating the extension of interdiction of trade in contraband to neutral territory, — a doctrine, we have seen, contradicted by Lampredi and Wheaton, and denounced by Azuni and "Historicus." This last writer stamps upon the view of Hautefeuille as "a monstrous and mischievous solecism," and ridicules Dr. Phillimore's astonishing error in approving it as coincident with "eternal justice." The Treaty of Washington turns the tables upon him with striking effect! Phillimore expresses his opinion that a true neutral should "abstain from every act which may better or worse the condition of a belligerent." "Historicus" thinks he proves that he should not, and utters the pious conviction that "neither the Government of Great Britain nor that of the United States is to be reckoned as a seceder from the institutes of international law, or a recruit to 'the principles of eternal justice.'" How does that stand now? Phillimore expresses regret at Judge Story's celebrated and oft-quoted dictum in the case of the *Santissima Trinidad*, (7 Wheaton, 340,) and Dr. Woolsey adds his own, "if it be true." They might have included in their regret an earlier position of the Federal administration in opposition to the true position taken by the French in 1796, and the historical statements of Kent, — all quoted on their side by the English of late. Dr. Woolsey also expresses himself, § 157, in favor of said neutrality, favors, § 160, the adoption by neutral governments of the American principle of requiring security of armed vessels, and suggests "a juster and humaner policy" than what "in the present state of the law of nations is felt to be obligatory." (§ 178, introd.) He adds, "The views of Phillimore, although he may confound the duty of a neutral State and that of a citizen of such State, do him great honor. If contraband trade in any article can be prevented within the borders of the neutral, *he is bound in right reason, but not by the present law of nations*, to prevent it." Even the British Government proposed, in 1862, to amend the law of England so as to prevent other Alabamas. This was in the winter, after the escape of the "290." The American Government, however, was first asked if its Foreign Enlistment

Act would be amended. As it was already * more conformed to reason, and true neutrality, and "eternal justice," no change was thought necessary till the British Act had been improved. In 1867, a commission appointed by Lord Derby's administration, recommended that the dispatching of an armed vessel, with knowledge that she would be employed for hostile purposes, and building her, "after being armed either within or beyond her Majesty's Dominions," should be embraced within the prohibitions of the Act. This was the American principle of just half a century before,† but till then not adopted, though prolonged and costly experience made it urgent. We do not here cite a Bill offered in Congress, in the exasperated period of the Rebellion, changing our legislation to accord with English practice, which passed the House of Representatives at Washington, but was killed, as might have been predicted, in the Senate,—though Mr. Bernard offsets this against the better, but equally futile, English amendments,—because it forms no part of the real history of the course of opinion. It was but an evidence of the American sense of wrong. Mr. Bernard says that it is an open question whether some new understanding is not required by recent experience among maritime nations, and whether it is not just and expedient for all nations that neutral fitting out of cruisers should be prohibited. He does not favor it, however, and suggests difficulties. Pres. Woolsey says some change for the future is demanded, (*N. Amer. Rev.*, 1870,) "either an alteration in English law, or some improvement in, or modification of, the law of nations." He commends the report of the English Commissioners of 1867, and Dr. Phillimore's suggestions touching prohibition of exports of war supplies. These things show the tendency of international law. The American idea, rendered pressing by American wrongs, is now made the basis

* Bernard says the two were "substantially identical on this head,"—plainly incorrect, however deserving he is of Dr. W.'s commendations for general correctness.

† Also a provision for detaining on a warrant, issued for reasonable or probable cause, a suspicious vessel.

of settlement between the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers.* Whether this would have come to pass if England had not also wronged and vexed United Germany, since, as she did United America ten years ago, and thus placed two out of the three greatest of the Great Powers in a wounded and sensitive condition, we will not say. But we will say that the result is a notable advance in the ethical and mutual relations of the Christian nations. It is a triumph of right reason over pride, of principle over love of gain, of right over wrong, of justice over selfishness, of the spirit of peace over the most dangerous incentives to war. It amply vindicates — if that were now needed — Mr. Sumner's memorable overthrow of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention. It makes good his becoming protestation that he maintained our righteous "Claims against England" in the interests of equity and international harmony. Among the many asseverations of British rulers that the Crown would never assent to the reference of the matters in dispute, was one of Lord Stanley's, (letter to Mr. Ford, Nov. 16, 1867,) that the "only point which her Majesty's Government can consent to refer, is the question of the *moral responsibility* of Her Majesty's Government," etc., etc., etc.; and that its failure, even in "legal" neutral "duties and relations," could be submitted to the decision of an arbiter only as it "involved a *moral* responsibility on the part of the British Government to make good losses of American citizens, caused by the Alabama and other vessels of the same class." In these four intervening years, England has largely increased her "moral responsibility" in that kind! and now accepts the oft-rejected arbitration proposed through Mr. Adams, eight years since, with instructions to her Commissioners that her moral responsibility is to be treated as if it had been a legal one, (*cum* protest that it was not!) and that this sort of quasi-legal responsibility is to be *bona fide* and actually legal in future! Such is the NEW DEPARTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

* The opinion of the "Nation" newspaper, May 18, on the "not new" doctrines, is too strong.

ARTICLE II.

DARWINISM.*

Let us pass on to notice other more positive objections to Darwin's theory—objections which he states fairly, and with great candor acknowledges their force. Yet he does not shrink from encountering the difficulties lying in his path. In his efforts to overcome them, he brings to his aid a vast array of facts and analogies, gathered from the whole range of organized beings, from the earliest traces of organic forms in the geological strata, to the swarming races which occupy the earth at the present time.

As already stated, Darwin does not meddle with the question of the origin of life on the earth. Supposing life to have already begun, far back in the past, in a few simple forms, he assumes for his theory the responsibility of accounting for all the forms and phenomena of life which have since come to light. He admits that one single authentic fact, which is in conflict with his theory, or does not admit of a plausible explanation in accordance with it, is fatal to its acceptance.

One of the difficult facts, requiring explanation, consists in the extreme complication and high perfection of some of the organs of living beings, such complication and perfection as seemingly to surpass the power of gradual variation, natural selection, and hereditary propagation, to elaborate and perfect them. The wing of the bat is one of the organs which presents this difficulty. The bat, in all other parts of its organization, is allied to the mole, shrew, and other small insect-eating animals. Hence, according to the theory of natural selection, its wing must have been developed from the paw of some shrew-like congener. How this could be done is the problem to be solved by the theory. Darwin encounters this difficulty by adducing a few cases, which he regards as repre-

* Concluded from May No.

senting the progressive stages of transition from naked paws to the perfected wing. For illustration, take the habit of leaping from branch to branch, and from tree to tree, so common with squirrels and monkeys. It is supposable, according to Darwin, that by some fortunate variation, individuals of these races should be born with a slightly developed fold of skin along the sides, between the anterior and posterior extremities. This, in their usual outspread manner of making their passage through the air, would buoy them up and give them a decided advantage over others in the habit of leaping. Natural selection, progressive variation, and the law of inheritance, according to the theory, would increase and perpetuate this peculiarity, until any supposable degree of perfection in the organ might be reached. The parachutes of the flying squirrel and of the flying lemur are spoken of as marking possible gradations in this line of development.

After giving all due weight to the above explanation, it seems to me that an unbiased judgment must pronounce it unsatisfactory. It gives us no instances of even probable transition forms between the paw and the wing; which forms ought to exist, if such changes have taken place in the past and are going on in the present. Then the anatomy of the bat's wing reveals a seeming skillfulness of adaptation, which quite lifts it out of the realm of chance and change, over which natural selection and the law of inheritance are supposed to reign.

The eye is another organ which receives attention in this connection. This difficulty is passed over—a very confident opponent would say, slurred over—by referring to supposed stages of development of this organ, from the eyeless inhabitants of caves and the rudimentary eye of the mole, to the most perfect state of the organ in the higher animals. Is it uncandid to say that this looks more like a subterfuge than an explanation? Besides, it ignores the fact that there is, in all complicated organs, more which requires explanation than their simple constituent and structural composition and form as mere material masses. But this will come up for more extended notice further on.

As may have been already anticipated, another difficulty in the way of the theory arises from the wonderful instincts of animals—instincts correlated to the degree of perfection of the organization, and often surpassing in results the highest wisdom and art of man. If the existing forms of life have been developed, by variation, natural selection, and inheritance, from lower and simpler forms, then new instincts must have come in to adjust the relations of the improved being to its higher sphere of life; and the new instincts must accurately correspond with the improved state of the organization.

The author meets this difficulty by first setting forth an analogy, or, as he would have us think, an identity between habit and instinct, and then adduces cases of instincts varying with the external conditions of existence—such variations being supposed to be steps in the progress of acquiring new instincts. Some of the instances of variable instincts adduced by the author are that of woodpeckers, which seek their food in the ground; that of land animals, inhabiting water coasts, seeking their food in the water, while usually living exclusively on the land, and other analogous cases. It is safe to leave the reader to judge how far such arguments go in explaining the cell-building instincts of the bee, the domestic economy of the hive, and the analogous facts as regards the internal polity of families of ants.

One of the most formidable obstacles in the way of the acceptance of Darwin's theory, is the existence of the neuter class of insects among ants and bees. As the neutral sex imposes sterility, this form of variation, with its wonderful development of the instincts of industry and skill, can not have been propagated by direct inheritance. The solution of this difficulty, offered by Darwin, does not seem quite satisfactory. It makes the supposition that certain parent bees or ants produce, as an occasional variation, a proportion of sterile offspring, which greatly surpass the parents in skillful industry for the benefit of the community. It supposes that the communities in which this variation occurs thereby become prosperous, and thus gain an advantage, in the struggle for existence,

over less fortunate communities. Hence, it would follow that those males and females which are endowed with the capability of propagating multitudinous neuters, would multiply more rapidly than others, and the peculiar variation would go on till the relative numbers of neutral and sexual offspring would be adjusted to the wants of the communities respectively.

As regards this solution of the difficulty in question, it is sufficient to say that the supposed changes are not known ever to have occurred in the past, or to be going on in the present. Moreover, it assumes so many things which, if true, would be quite as hard to explain as the original difficulty, that we are compelled to believe that the problem still waits for a solution.

Another difficulty grows out of the observed geographical distribution of plants and animals. Regions which are separated by wide oceans, lofty and continuous mountain barriers, or by the interlocation of a tropical climate, present but few closely allied forms in common. This is not inconsistent with Darwin's theory, as the ancestral types of living forms are supposed to have originated far back in time, when the relations between land and water, mountain and plain, heat and cold, were very different from what they are at present. The diverging descendants of the primitive types, being separated by the upheaval of mountains and the subsidence of land, giving rise to oceans, would go on diverging, under different conditions of existence, becoming more and more unlike. The general facts of geographical distribution, as already suggested, agree with this hypothesis. But there are some identical, and many closely allied species found on opposite sides of wide oceans and lofty mountain ranges, and in northern and southern hemispheres, with an incompatible tropical climate between them.

If the general diversity of forms, in widely distant regions, is accounted for by long separation, what shall we do with the particular cases of similarity and identity? Darwin replies by suggesting possible modes of migration between divided regions. He supposes the communication between the northern and southern hemispheres to have been effected by two

alternating glacial periods on the two sides of the equator. The author's suggestions under this head can hardly take a higher rank than that of plausible guesses, and therefore can not be accepted as a solution of the difficulty in question. Yet they are deeply interesting and instructive, apart from their bearing on his theory.

Again, if existing living forms have descended, or, rather, ascended, from a few, simple, primitive types, by a slow and scarcely perceptible progress of variation, the geological strata ought to have preserved the remains, not of distinct species, but of a continuous series of forms, running into each other by imperceptible gradations, so that any two forms separated by distinct specific differences, should have, lying between them, other intermediate forms, insensibly graduating into the two species and into each other. Now, Darwin freely admits that the geological record, as far as it has been consulted, testifies to the succession of distinct species, in the absence of intermediate forms. He endeavors to break the force of this objection by first showing the general agreement of the geological record with his theory, and then attempting to account for the particular disagreement by proving that the geological record is too imperfect to be relied upon to sustain the objection.

The general agreement of the facts of geology with Darwin's theory may be thus stated: First, the fossil remains of extinct races show a general progress, in the order of time, from the lower to the higher organic forms. Then, if we take three successive geological formations, naming them A, B and C, from below upward, we shall find that the fossil remains of A are more closely allied to those of B than to those of C, and that those of B are intermediate in form between those of A and C. This holds true, though there may be no identical species connecting the three formations. But the knotty fact for Darwin's theory is, that the transitions are made by leaps from one species to another, and not by an imperceptible gliding of forms into each other, as the theory requires. Darwin seems to be aware that his efforts to adduce a few intermediate

forms are not quite successful, and he falls back, in the end, on the imperfection of the geological record.

Once more, geology not infrequently reveals the sudden appearance and wide-spread prevalence of a new species in formations, in which they had not before existed. This fact, unless its force can be broken by other facts or by cogent arguments, stands in glaring violation, I had almost said contempt of Darwin's theory. The author meets this fact with supposed or imaginary migrations; and in the absence of any clue to the regions from which the new species may have migrated, he again falls back on the imperfections of the geological record.

In conclusion, under this head, what shall we say to the question how far Darwin has succeeded in establishing his theory on a basis of probability?

For myself, I would say, the general drift of the facts and analogies adduced by him is such as to lend a certain plausibility to the theory, while, on the other hand, it seems to me to fail in the encounter with almost all the trial tests of its validity. I think it is confronted, at the present stage of scientific knowledge, by more than one *experimentum crucis*, before which it will have to wait long before it can assert its claim to general acceptance. To bring the theory to the standard of the inductive logic, it may be said that the steps of induction and deduction have been duly taken, and appropriately elaborated; but attempts at verification have been almost uniformly failures.

Darwin, himself, seems to be conscious of his doubtful success in meeting and removing the objections to his theory. He says: "Indeed it will be thought that I have an overweening confidence in the principle of natural selection, when I do not admit that such wonderful and well-established facts at once annihilate the theory." Again, with regard to the case of neuter insects, he says: "I must confess that, with all my faith in natural selection, I should never have anticipated that this could have been efficient to so high a degree, had not the case of neuter insects convinced me of the fact." One can hardly

forbear a smile at the simplicity of this remark, which reveals at once the spirit of candor and the extreme bias of the author. The facts, which convince him of the wonderful efficiency of the principle of natural selection, will stand, to the majority of thinking minds, as irrefragable objections to his theory, unless more satisfactory explanations of them can be given than any to be found in his book.

DARWINISM IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE MATERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE DAY.

Though *we* may decide that the theory of natural selection is not sustained by the facts and arguments adduced in its support, not such will be the decision of a large number of the most active minds of our age. Those who approach the question exclusively on the side of material facts and laws, will be almost sure to agree with Darwin; while those who encounter the theory mainly in those deductions which seemingly conflict with long-cherished beliefs, will, as certainly, disagree with him.

But a question of deeper interest is this: What is to be the effect of Darwin's theory on the thought of the present and succeeding generations? I can not resist the conviction that its influence is destined to be profound, far-reaching and controlling. It apparently harmonizes so many facts, and plausibly accounts for so many observed relations; it so falls in with a phase of speculation which is older than Aristotle, and has not been without partisans from that time to this; it apparently bridges so many sloughs of despond and levels so many hills of difficulty for many minds which have long been aching to find their way from inorganic matter, through mere molecular forces, up to the highest manifestations of life, that it can not fail to draw to its investigation and support an important share of the mental activity which is at work at the solution of the great problems of existence.

This brings up the question of the precise relation of Darwin's system to the skeptical philosophy of the day.

This philosophy holds, and is ransacking every corner of the earth, every nook of the ocean-depths, and the records of the ages, stored up in the geological strata, to prove that all organized beings have sprung out of unorganized matter through the action of the mere material forces with which it is endowed. This is not Darwin's doctrine. He expresses the opinion that "life, with its several powers, was originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one, and that from so simple a beginning, endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been and are being evolved." The material philosophy would substitute a supposed life-producing agency of the molecular forces of matter for the original inbreathing of life by the Creator, spoken of by our author. Having accomplished this long leap at the outset, the materialist is content make the remainder of the journey with Darwin. This is the relation of Darwinism to modern materialism.

To present a complete view of the subject in hand, it is important to inquire how the materialist proposes to pass over the gulf of gulfs which divides non-living from living matter, — utter passivity and blank insensibility from active, conscious life.

In the first place, there is a certain chemical compound, believed to be an essential constituent of all living beings, and which is not known ever to have been produced outside of living organs. This compound is called protein, and is composed of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen. With the addition of very small proportions of sulphur and phosphorus, it constitutes the principal basis of the living tissues in animals, and is an omnipresent vital product in plants. Of its importance to life, Mulder, one of the highest authorities in organic chemistry, thus speaks: "It is unquestionably the most important of all known substances in the organic kingdom. Without it, no life appears possible on our planet. Through its means the chief phenomena of life are produced."

This substance is supposed to be formed in the vital organs, by the action of carbonic acid, water and ammonia on each other. The problem is, how to compound this important sub-

stance, as a preliminary step to organization, without the aid of pre-existing vitality. Concerning the task which the materialist sets for himself, and his hopes and expectations of success, take the following statement of Huxley: "To enable us to say that we know anything about the experimental origination of organization and life, the investigator ought to be able to take inorganic matters, such as carbonic acid, water, ammonia, and the salines, in any sort of inorganic combination, and be able to build them up into protein matter, and that protein matter ought to begin to live in an organic form. *That*, nobody has done, as yet, and I suspect that it will be a long while before any body does do it. But the thing is by no means as impossible as it now looks, for the researches of modern chemistry have shown us the finger-post pointing to the road that may lead to it."

Such were the views of Huxley in 1860. Since that time there has been no abatement of the active quest in pursuit of the great secret. All over the scientific world, eager eyes are searching, and skillful hands are manipulating, in hope of witnessing the formation of protein,—the first important step towards the origination of organic life from lifeless matter. The hopes of success which inspire these efforts are based on successes already achieved in the production of other so-called organic compounds.

One of the most marked examples of success in this line is the production of urea, by combining together cyanic acid and ammonia. Urea is found dissolved in the urine, and for a long time it was thought to be impossible to produce it by any combination effected outside of the living organs. The success of chemists in compounding this substance out of inorganic materials has encouraged them to hope for like success in producing such higher organic compounds as protein. We may better judge how far chemists are entitled to take encouragement from this success, by considering the rank of urea among other organic compounds.

Urea is universally regarded as one of the products of the first stages of decay of the waste materials of the organs, or of

superfluous nutrient matter in the system. Hence, it is only indirectly a product of the vital organs. Directly, it is the result of the decadence of real vital products. In this respect it agrees with carbonic acid and ammonia; except that it is the result of the first stage of decay, while they are the products of the last stage. Here is a distinction between urea and protein, so broad that it does not seem to me quite safe to reason very confidently from success in compounding the one from inorganic materials to a probable like success in compounding the other. So that we can hardly say, so far as chemical composition is concerned, that much progress has been made towards passing from lifeless to living matter.

With regard to the second step in the progress laid down by Huxley, that "the protein matter shall begin to live in an organic form," some alleged cases of spontaneous generation constitute the only facts which deserve a moment's consideration. It should be observed, in this connection, that the advocates of spontaneous generation do not claim to have ever witnessed the origination of living organisms from strictly inorganic matter. No one pretends that pure water, either alone or combined with other inorganic substances, and cut off from all access of organic particles, or organic germs, ever shows the slightest sign of life, in any form. It is only when water moistens, or holds in solution, some vegetable or animal substance that it develops a coating of mould, or swarms with animalculæ. So that, if we admit the claim set up for spontaneous generation, we do not have life springing out of inorganic matter, but a new form of life, superinduced upon matter which has already lived, and still retains the composition and constitution which it owes to pre-existing living organisms. A book has been recently published, entitled, "The Beginnings of Life." The previously published experiments of the author show that he only claims to have succeeded in breeding certain minute organisms from solutions or infusions of organic matter, after having made certain the impossibility of the presence of organic germs. Therefore, if the success of the author is all that he claims, there must have been a beginning of life before his beginnings, to prepare the organic mate-

rials used in his experiments. But the experiments of Pasteur, and the recently expressed judgment of Huxley cast serious doubts on the validity of the claim to even this equivocal success of engendering the very lowest forms of life from matter which had already been lifted out of the inorganic realm by pre-existing and higher forms of life.

It is but fair to state, that the question of spontaneous generation, as above defined, is still in dispute between men of science, who have devoted attention and labor to the subject. For some years the experiments of Pasteur were regarded as having finally settled the question against every form of spontaneous generation. Recent experiments by Dr. Bastian have led him to question the validity of the conclusions, drawn from the experiments of Pasteur. Huxley, who not only looks favorably but hopefully on efforts to trace the origin of living forms from inorganic matter, gives his judgment on the side of Pasteur. With the uniform results, in the same direction, of the numerous, ingenious, and carefully prepared experiments of Pasteur, and with the corresponding results of the millions of like experiments made every year in the process of canning vegetable and animal products, Huxley very naturally concludes, that the few cases of apparent exception to the general rule are more likely to be instances of failure to destroy or exclude organic germs from the infusions used, than of the generation of living organisms in the absence of such germs.

But whichever party to this controversy may prevail, we have, in either case, failed as yet to find any continuous path, by which inorganic matter makes the transition to the constituency of living forms, unaided by pre-existing life. Thus the materialist has not yet found the beginnings of the branching lines of Darwinian succession,—the rudimentary forms, from which variation, natural selection, and hereditary succession are supposed to have evolved all living existences on the earth.*

* The progress of discovery since the above was written tends to invalidate the claim of Dr. Bastian, to have witnessed the generation of organic life apart from the presence of living germs.

The programme of the materialist is all very simple. It is only the chemical combination of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen in the form of protein,—then the addition of slight traces of sulphur and phosphorus,—then the compound “beginning to live” as “protoplasm,” soon taking on the form of a nucleated cell; then cell-multiplication, till a rudimentary plant or animal is produced; then Darwinism carried out in practice,—and we have standing before us in all their perfection the winning beauty, the sublime harmony, and transcendent mystery of the organic kingdom,—all evolved from dead matter through the agency of the molecular forces, with which it is endowed. But there is a slight obstacle to implicit faith in the reality of this beautiful scheme of things. As a matter of science, it remains unproved in all its parts and particulars; and as far as the evidence goes, the creative power in nature utterly refuses to adopt its rules in shaping plans or working out processes.

DARWINISM, AS SUPPLEMENTED BY MATERIALISM IN ITS BEARING
ON THE QUESTION OF A PERSONAL CREATOR.

The reader will have observed the bearing of the foregoing on the question at issue between theism and atheism. Though Darwin distinctly recognizes an original creation by divine interposition, materialists, who accept his theory, do not admit the necessity of such interposition, to account for the observed forms of existence. They cling to the belief that the molecules of matter, in their very nature, possess a life-producing power, adequate to originate all living forms, without the aid of personal, intelligent agency. It is true, that they fail at all points to make good this assumption by an appeal to facts, and can only claim at best, in the language of the cautious Huxley, “to have shown the finger-post, pointing to the road, that may lead to” a verification of their deductions. With what has gone before, the reader may be safely left to judge of the reliability of this finger-post, which, standing on no road, only points toward one, which road, when found, will lead some

whither, and *may* lead to the longed-for discovery of creation without a Creator.

But suppose that future discoveries of the powers of matter should bridge the chasm between the organic and the inorganic, would this necessarily land us in blank materialism,—and its natural result, atheism? Should the materialist successfully achieve his wish and aim in the matter of scientific discovery, would this leave us without God in the world? It might modify our views of the mode in which intelligent agency acts, but it could never shake our belief in the reality of such agency. Yet atheism assumes that it is one great mission of science, to banish this belief from the human mind.

Accordingly, those scientists, who were already committed to materialistic views, hailed with enthusiasm the appearance of Darwin's work, as the dawn of scientific atheism. Such persons, going beyond Darwin's aim or intention, value his theory mainly for the relief, as they say, which it brings to mankind, from the superstition of a Deity. C. L. Brace, in the "North American Review," names several distinguished men of science in Germany who accept this theory as a full and sufficient substitute for the belief in an intelligent Creator,—and who dwell with undisguised satisfaction on the great service, as they assume, of Darwin's theory in removing from the theory of the universe the necessity of a personal Creator.

Two fallacious assumptions lie at the basis of the so-called scientific atheism. The first is, that to ascertain and clearly state the formal law, or the observed order of a class of phenomena, is a full and sufficient explanation of those phenomena. The other is, that the idea of a personal agency at work in the movements of nature, is at war with the idea of law. The first fallacy makes little or no account of cause; the second assumes, that personal agency in nature is equivalent to fitful and capricious intermeddling with established order.

Of those who fall into the first fallacy, some ignore or reject cause altogether, as non-existent, or lying outside of positive knowledge. Others seemingly ascribe causal power to law,—

speaking of phenomena as the result of law;—as if a law were endowed with a certain efficiency, instead of being, as it really is, only a name for the observed order of phenomena, expressed in appropriate words. Both parties agree in regarding the idea of personal agency in nature, and that of the sway of law, as incompatible with each other. Thus Comte supposes that he has satisfactorily proved the doctrine of atheism, when he has appealed to the prediction of eclipses, as an illustration of the perfection of astronomic order. He assumes, that if there were a Deity, who could touch the solar system with intermeddling fingers, disorder would certainly ensue, and no one could tell what astronomical wonder might or might not occur at any moment. At such philosophical presumption we can almost fancy the Sovereign One looking down with amused compassion, and saying, “Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself.”

But in order to estimate the deductions of atheism at their true value, it will be necessary to call attention to a most important class of facts, the significance of which scientists very generally ignore, sometimes slur over, or occasionally recognize with a sidelong sneer. These facts may be more briefly and intelligibly presented by first bringing into notice the ruling idea, which runs through them, and harmonizes them into a consistent unity.

The ruling idea, which runs through all the ranks of organized beings, and makes of them one family, in a higher sense than that of Darwin's assumed law of genealogical descent, is implied in the very word *organ*,—instrument, in its original signification. The parts of a living being are not merely parts, but instruments subserving important uses for the advantage of the whole. Lop off or destroy any of these parts, and you have not merely marred a form—you have suspended a power, and entailed loss and damage on the being thus mutilated. The ruling idea, then, which runs through all the grades of organization, is the subserviency of means to ends, or of instruments to uses. This idea is equally applicable to the simplest organic forms and structures, and to the

most complicated organisms, in which many and diverse instruments perform tasks equally diverse, and yet work together on a system so delicately adjusted, that they are enabled to co-operate in the production of the most beneficent results.

Here is an important class of facts to be accounted for,—or, to use a favorite expression of Darwin and Huxley,—to be made intelligible,—facts which they have but slightly noticed, and have failed to explain, either by the laws of molecular forces or the theory of natural selection. If it be supposable that molecular forces are adequate to do anything and everything in the way of compounding matter, and shaping it into all conceivable structures and forms, are they equally capable of forecasting and planning the different uses of these diverse structures and forms?

It may be that the progress of knowledge, since the days of Solomon, has rendered somewhat less puzzling the question, “how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child?”—but how, in a higher sense, does a germinal vesicle, with scarcely distinguishable parts, grow in accordance with a definite plan,—gradually evolving heart, lungs, digestive apparatus, bony frame, muscles, brain, nerves, and organs of sense? I do not ask whether molecular forces might not have shaped any or all of these organs and structures, as mere material forms. I do not know why molecular forces may not shape an eye, as well as a crystal. I only know, that, as a matter of observation, they never have done it, without the aid of pre-existing life. It is not, that such a mass of matter as the eye, might not supposably be shaped by the action of material forces. The thing to be explained is, that, in form, structure, and composition, the growth of the eye is executing a plan, looking to a future result of the most marvelous significance. Or rather, passing from the eye to the entire system of organs, the wonderful fact to be made intelligible is this, that the little germinal vesicle should assume the task of evolving a *system*, embracing many and diverse organs or instruments, so connected and correlated as to co-operate har-

moniously in a circle of functions, in which each is reciprocally helpful to every other, — that these organs should grow up together in secret, many of them having no relation to existing conditions, but wonderfully providential, as preparatory for new conditions to be encountered at birth, — that this system of organs thus elaborated in darkness, should come forth to the light, a living, acting, conscious creature, ere long to be filled and thrilled with wonder at the mystery of its own existence, — that this wonderful being, on entering upon its new relations, should be found to fit, at a thousand points, into a pre-existing system, with a perfection almost surpassing conception. Such are some of the facts, which the researches of modern scientists have not yet succeeded in making quite intelligible, either by discoveries, as regards the laws of molecular action, or the results of natural selection.

With such a problem waiting for solution, we look in vain to material forces and laws for the key that shall unlock the secret. Such flashes of intelligence, foresight, plan, do not originate with the molecules of matter; and vain is the search that looks no higher for their cause. With eyes bent to the ground, intently prying into the secrets of matter, we ask, "Where shall wisdom be found, and where is the place of understanding? The depth saith it is not in me. The sea saith it is not with me." Earth, air, time, and space, each in turn echoes back the response, "it is not in me." A voice of loftier tone and deeper import seems to rise on the ensuing silence, "Why seek ye the living among the dead? Look into your own conscious being for the facts and analogies, which shall suggest a rational solution of the great problem of living nature."

This brings us face to face with the almost universal recognition of an intelligent Creator, as the only adequate cause of the phenomena, to which especial attention has been called above. Even those who carefully exclude the idea of a Creator from all departments of scientific research, do not wholly escape the contagion of the prevailing conviction. Thus Huxley, in speaking of the evolution of the perfect

animal, with its complex structure, from the almost structureless germ, says the process goes on "as if there were an artificer at work at each" of the organs and parts. Again he speaks of the evolution of the ovum of the salamander or newt as "like the shaping of a lump of clay by a skilled modeller,—as if a hidden artist were striving with skillful manipulation to perfect his work."

One can hardly understand why the man who unconsciously drops such hints and suggestions all along the path of scientific inquiry, should be averse to the recognition of an intelligent Creator, as a cause falling appropriately within the domain of science. If the facts of organization, both in processes and results, are such as they might be, if planned and executed by a skillful artificer, why not believe that they have been planned and executed by a skillful artificer? Why not believe that there exists, apart from matter, or immanent in, and working through matter, a great conscious, planning mind, with skill and power adequate to devise and execute all the wonderful systems of living mechanism, which meet us everywhere throughout the organic kingdoms?

But it is not enough to call attention to the prevailing belief in a personal Creator, or to show that the elements of that belief haunt the minds of scientific men, who seemingly reject it. We ought to be able to show that the induction which eventuates in this belief is in accord with the most legitimate scientific procedure, and justified by the facts in the case. In attempting to show this, we do not argue for the existence of a Creator from the phenomena of organization. We take those phenomena as we find them in nature, and among all known and possible causes we seek for that one which will adequately account for them. The procedure is the reverse of the so-called argument from final causes; which latter form of argument is sometimes objected to as unphilosophical. It would be more correct to say that it is unscientific. Though perfectly legitimate as corroborative of an existing belief, it is unscientific, as not constituting a homogeneous element in any particular body of science. Let it be understood, then, that I am

not using the argument from final causes, but trying to make intelligible facts of the greatest moment and of the most surpassing interest. I am not trying to prove the existence of a personal Creator; I am trying to find an adequate reason for the existence of facts everywhere known and recognized.

If we now enquire for the legitimate scientific mode of searching for that reason, we shall find it in connection with the principle of analogy. Analogy supplies the basis of the logical artifice applicable to the case. The dictum of analogical reasoning, which is of universal application, is this: Things which agree in essential particulars in which they have been compared, are likely to agree in other related particulars in which they have not yet been compared. Thus, guided by analogy, we spread the results of a limited range of observation over a wider field of related phenomena. Then, following the clue afforded by analogy, we enter that wider field in search of the anticipated agreements. In proportion as our anticipations are realized, the deductions based upon analogy are confirmed, and we acquire a confident belief in other agreements which lie beyond the reach of direct comparison.

The application of this principle to the phenomena of organization will be better understood and estimated if we take along with us a parallel case of the application of the same principle in the inorganic world. I refer to the alleged discovery of the physical constitution and, to some extent, the chemical composition of the sun, fixed stars, and nebulae, by the aid of analogies brought to light by the spectroscope. This instrument discloses certain spectral phenomena of the light emitted by white-hot solids and liquids, as also the unlike phenomena of the light of flames, luminous gases, or vapors variously colored. It also brings to view a wonderful series of related phenomena, by testing the light from a white-hot solid or liquid after it has passed through flame or, which is the same thing, luminous gas or vapor. Every known material element is found to exhibit phenomena peculiar to itself; so that the application of the spectroscope has come to be recognized as the most delicate of all chemical tests. The application of this

test to the light of the sun, fixed stars, and nebulae is supposed to reveal to us many important facts as regards their physical constitution and chemical composition. The validity of these inductions is based wholly on the observed analogies between the spectral phenomena of these celestial bodies and those of terrestrial matter. Since these bodies agree with terrestrial matter in exhibiting certain spectral phenomena, it is assumed without hesitation that they agree with it in those conditions of composition and constitution, without which the like phenomena are never observed at the earth's surface.

Thus the application of the spectroscope is assumed to have added the following facts to the body of our scientific knowledge of the heavenly bodies:

1. The body of the sun consists of a solid or liquid mass in a state of intense heat.
2. This central hot mass is surrounded with an atmosphere of luminous gas or vapor, called its photosphere.
3. Many material elements belonging to our earth enter into the constitution of the photosphere of the sun.
4. Many of the fixed stars are constituted like the sun, each consisting of a white-hot central mass, surrounded by a photosphere, which contains many terrestrial elements—some not found in the photosphere of the sun.
5. The nebulae—even those which are resolvable by powerful telescopes—consist of luminous gases or vapors, since they exhibit the spectral phenomena peculiar to flame, and not those which characterize the unmodified light from white-hot solids or liquids.

To these truly logical, yet bold inductions, I have yet to learn of the first word of objection from any quarter of the scientific world. Let us see how the matter stands as regards the application of the same principle of analogy to the characteristic phenomena of the organic world, as set forth above.

It should be borne in mind that the essentially characteristic phenomena of living organisms are not the forms, structure, and connection of parts, in themselves considered; nor simply the formal laws of succession, by which generations

follow each other in lines of genealogical descent. The subserviency of means to ends, of instruments to uses; the co-operation of numerous organs in an intelligible system of order; these are the ruling facts of organization, which need to be accounted for. Let molecular forces do everything in the way of constructing and shaping forms, if they can. What we most need to know is, why these forms are not merely forms, but instruments wonderfully adapted to specific uses; why these instruments are put together on an intelligible plan, not having for its basis mere symmetry of form, but an orderly co-operation in a marvellous series of actions, running on through years. It is the subserviency of instruments to uses, and not the material forms of those instruments, that here requires explanation. It is the origin of the plan of the structure, and not the shaping of the materials which enter into its construction, that needs to be made intelligible.

We have only to follow to their legitimate results analogies which daily observation and experience lay in our path, in order to find a satisfactory solution of the problem of organization. All the works of man, to a greater or less extent, are examples of the combination of means for the attainment of ends; of the adaptation of instruments to specific uses. As a matter of observation and experience, we know these works to be the productions of intelligent personal agents. As a matter of intuitive reason we know that it is impossible that they should have originated from any other source. We know intuitively that an intelligent personal agent is the only adequate cause of plan and system in combining means for the attainment of ends.

We find the same law of adaptation of means to ends running through all the ranks and forms of organization. Analogy compels us in like manner to ascribe their origin to the only conceivable cause,—intelligent agency. Organized living forms agree with the works of man in being modeled in accordance with the law of intelligent adaptation; therefore logical consistency forces us to accept the belief that they agree with those works in being the products of intelligent

agency. The analogical argument which compels this belief is more cogent than most of the like arguments, which win the ready assent of scientific men, as regards the phenomena of the inorganic world. If the alleged revelations of the spectroscope may be allowed to pass unquestioned into the belief of the scientific world, why this insurrection of science, in the form of materialism, against the belief in a personal Creator? — a belief which rests on a basis of rational validity, at least, equally firm. Unless all that we hear about the constitution of the mass of the sun, the constitution and composition of its photosphere, is a sham and a delusion, having no foundation in fact, then is the existence of an infinitely-wise, all-powerful, personal Creator the mightiest fact of the universe. I say *personal*, for only a person can plan, select, devise, with intelligent aim. The god of the pantheist will not do. To endow matter with omnipresent, orderly-acting powers, — to try to bind the material universe into a harmonious unity under the name of Pan, does not make intelligible the world, as we find it. Personality alone is capable of intelligent purpose, deliberate aim; — and this is what we see in the adaptations of all organic forms.

What has materialism to oppose to the foregoing conclusion? Perhaps we may be told, that science, by the discovery of the laws of nature, has sufficiently accounted for all existence, without the agency of a Creator. It is sufficient to reply, that the laws of phenomena simply represent the mode of their occurrence, but not the *reason* or the *cause* of that occurrence. As regards the phenomena of adaptation and co-operation for a future result, the most that materialism can do is to set forth the facts of the case, — leaving those facts unexplained, and unexplainable by any theory which accepts atheism. Perhaps the materialist will call our attention to certain seemingly useless parts of organic forms, — parts which are said to be inexplicable on any intelligible plan of adaptation, but perfectly explainable as transition forms in successive stages of development. It may be answered, that our ignorance of the office of certain parts can not invalidate our knowledge of the

office of other parts. If we can not see how the spleen works in a system of organic adjustment, we can see how the stomach, heart, and lungs thus work. If a few small bones in the animal frame are unintelligible on any supposable plan of intelligent adaptation, this does not dim in the least the light of that divine intelligence which gleams forth from every other part of the structure. If we concede to the objection the full weight claimed for it in favor of the theory of development, it only modifies somewhat our ideas of the mode of action of the intelligent personal Cause, without having the least legitimate force to shake our belief in that Cause. It may be that the objector will deny the applicability of the analogical argument to the question of a personal Creator. But he does not hesitate to apply the same argument to all other scientific questions, and scruples not to accept its deductions as undoubted facts of science or laws of nature. Yet the analogy which is applied to the question of creative intelligence is of higher authority than any other; as its recognition comes through personal experience, and rests on consciousness and intuition, while the recognition of all other analogies rests primarily on outward observation. Thus we know, by a more intimate and reliable conviction, that only an intelligent, personal cause can account for the adaptations which we observe in the organic world, than that by which we assume that nothing but iron in the photosphere of the sun can account for certain spectral phenomena exhibited by that luminary. If the logic of science rules our conviction in the latter case, for a stronger reason it binds our belief to the recognition of a personal Creator.

We may therefore fairly claim, that our belief in the existence of a personal Creator rests on a scientific basis of fact, which will remain unshaken, whatever may or may not prove true, as regards the origin of living forms and the transitions through which they have passed and are passing. Suppose the dream of Huxley should be realized as regards the origin of life from inorganic matter, and suppose that the progress of knowledge should more and more confirm the theory of

Darwin, there will still remain those wonderful adaptations, which are characteristic of organization; and these are only intelligible, as the products of creative design. If under the hands of a skillful manipulator, inorganic matter should take on the forms of life,—should shape, adapt, and bind together in harmonious union a system of organs, and these organs should co-operate in working out a plan, such as is implied in the very fact of living,—the *adaptations* and the *plan* would have originated with an intelligent Creator, and not through the blind action of molecular forces. If we adopt the improbable supposition, that the bat has acquired wings by development from the insignificant paws of the shrew, and has learned to use its new organs in flight,—an intelligent Creator has guided the process and implanted the new instinct to correspond. I am the farthest possible from believing that such phenomena have ever occurred, or ever will occur, as the simple results of molecular action, or of natural selection. But I wish strongly to express a firm belief that, whatever may possibly or conceivably occur in that direction, it can not possibly or conceivably shake the firm foundation on which rests the belief in the existence of a personal God.

The power and plan of a Creator, being made conspicuously manifest through the phenomena of organization, must of necessity be present, pervading and controlling in the lower sphere of inorganic forces and laws, for here also we meet with adaptation and orderly adjustment. Indeed, material forces and laws can be naught else than the Creator's voluntary efficiency in, and deliberate guidance of, the material universe; whether we consider the astronomic order that reigns in the planetary spaces, or the equilibrium and motions of molecules and atoms.

With this view of the order of the universe, we need not be much troubled with the special difficulties which scientists have raised, touching the origin and history of life on our globe. The wisdom and power which could plan and execute such works as meet us at every turn, could easily make the transition from the inorganic to the organic. The author of

the plan may be supposed to be master of its details. The builder of a structure may be trusted to compound and shape the materials to be used in construction. If protein is essential to life, the author of life is not dependent for its production on molecular forces, which act independently of his control. If protoplasm has a life of its own, which is the basis of all other forms of life, its mysterious endowment and destiny have originated in creative power and plan.

In attempting to set forth the scientific basis of our belief in a Creator, I do not assume to trace the history of the origin of this belief. Its origin in the history of the race and in the life of the individual, is long anterior to the rise of scientific knowledge. It springs up spontaneously in the presence of the great spectacle of the universe. From the earliest dawn of mental activity, the child recognizes in the forms, adaptations and orderly movements around him, something kindred to the constructive intelligence of which he is conscious in himself. The child's oft-repeated question — Who made this? Who made that? — shows that his faith has already recognized a maker of the things that are. And when you answer his question, by telling him that God has made them all, you have communicated to him no new revelation; you have only given him a personal name for the wisdom and power which already fill his little soul with wonder and reverence. It is not till skepticism calls in question this natural, spontaneous belief, that we ever think of sustaining it by proofs. And when we are called upon to give a reason for the faith that is in us, we have only to reduce to words and to express in logical forms the inarticulate consciousness in which the belief took root, far back in the days of childhood.

ARTICLE III.

WHOM SHALL WE INVITE TO THE LORD'S TABLE ?

If we mistake not, all possible modes of invitation to the Lord's Supper may be reduced to eight. There may be invited, (1) all mankind ; (2) all who desire to be Christians ; (3) all who believe themselves to be the followers of Christ ; (4) all church members ; (5) all members in evangelical churches ; (6) only members of the same denomination ; (7) only members of the same local church ; (8) no formal invitation — the elements being offered to every one present.

The *first* and *eighth* forms, being substantially the same, have probably no advocates outside the small coterie of "Free Religionists." A universalism in church privileges so bald and broad as this, placing saints and sinners, friends and enemies, a Paul and a Voltaire on the same footing, is too repugnant even to depraved humanity to be dangerous ; and we dismiss the forms of invitation that involve it, as needing no formal refutation.

The *second* form makes no distinction between a desire which, including choice, constitutes a person a true believer, and a desire, which excluding choice, is possessed by the enemies of Christ Jesus. As distinct from the *third*, it includes only the better class,—and asks to the Lord's Table those who are not, and who know that they are not, true Christians. The rich young ruler who went away from Christ sorrowing, well illustrates the class intended to be reached by this form of invitation. They lack the one thing needful.

The *third* form includes "all who believe themselves to be the followers of Christ." Some advocates of this urge in its favor, "that the church is a human organization, and has the liberty to extend its hospitality at its own pleasure ; and, in the use of this liberty, it should be liberal and magnanimous."

Has, indeed, the church the liberty to invite at pleasure whom it will? The proof of what we hold to be the only correct form, contains the answer of this question. So we pass on.

The *fourth* form requires, as a prerequisite to the Supper, membership in some church, but makes no distinction between orthodox and heterodox, the churches of Christ and the synagogues of Satan. This lies, therefore, under the condemnation, in part at least, of the preceding, and is rejected by the arguments for the true form.

The *seventh* form in confining the communion of saints to the bounds of a local church, is altogether too narrow. It makes the Supper a family meal, to which no member of the household of faith, not connected with that particular church, can come. This form so cuts across the tender ties which unite all believers into one, that it should not be adopted except upon Divine authority. Though this be held by some to be right in theory, in practice this form is seldom, if ever, given.

The *sixth* form of invitation is somewhat wider, including all of the same faith and order. It makes the denominational line the limit of this mode of Christian fellowship. But the form is still too narrow to satisfy either the deep longings of the renewed heart, or the fundamental law of the churches.

Against these seven forms of invitation, and against any possible combination of them, objections, in our opinion, conclusive, though differing in form and in degree of force, can be brought; which objections will be developed as we proceed.

There is left then but the *fifth* form, midway between the extremes, which asks to the Lord's Table only members, in regular standing, of evangelical churches. This form, in our opinion, is neither too broad nor too narrow. And, in giving our reasons for our opinion, we shall attempt to show, on the one hand, why the invitation ought not to be restricted to any one denomination, and, on the other, why it should not be extended either to non-evangelical churches or to all those who may believe themselves to be the followers of Jesus Christ. If this form of invitation, common amongst Protestants, can be vindicated against these three, much more can it against all the other possible forms.

That the invitation to the Lord's Table ought not to be restricted to those of the same denomination, is, as it seems to us, conclusively proved by the fact that God does not restrict his spiritual blessings to any one denomination. No one communion so monopolizes the gift of eternal life, through the renewing visitation of the Holy Spirit, as rightly to debar all other denominations from the privilege of joining with it in celebrating the Lord's Supper. The principle on which all true Christian fellowship fundamentally rests, is wider than denominational lines. This principle, we claim, was definitely stated by the apostle Peter in the Council at Jerusalem; and on it the decision of that Council was expressly founded. Let us review the case, and show its application to the one in hand.

The church in Antioch was endangered by certain teachers who affirmed that except a man be circumcised after the manner of Moses, he could not be saved. "When therefore Paul and Barnabas had no small dissension and disputation with them, they (the church) determined that Paul and Barnabas, and certain other of them, (the brethren of the church) should go up to Jerusalem unto the apostles and elders about this question."* It appears from the record that, neither at Antioch nor at Jerusalem, did the apostles assume to settle this dispute by the authority of their apostleship; but, instead, after there had been much disputing, Peter arose, and, referring to his visit to the Roman centurion, Cornelius, an uncircumcised Gentile, said, "Ye know how that a good while ago God made choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the gospel, and believe. And God which knoweth the hearts, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as unto us; and put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith."† On the principle that the heart-searching God put no difference between the circumcised and the uncircumcised believer, they abrogated that rite, of which it was said, at its institution, "and my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant."‡

Now we claim that this principle is the Divine criterion by

* Acts xv. 1, 2.

† Acts xv. 7—9.

‡ Gen. xvii. 13.

which all similar disputes among Christians are to be settled : and we ask, are the outpourings of the Holy Spirit confined within the line of Papal belief and polity ? Are they limited to the circle of churches holding immersion to be the only mode of baptism ? Are they shut up within the narrowing confines of the Psalm-singing churches ? Do not the Methodists, the Lutherans, the Presbyterians, the Congregationalists sometimes receive this "witness" of God ? Now, if God thus bears them witness, we fail to see how the close communionists can escape the scathing rebuke, addressed by Peter to the schismatics in the Council at Jerusalem, "Now therefore why tempt ye God, to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples ?" * How can any church without tempting God, require, as a condition of fellowship, what God does not regard in the gift of his Spirit ?

How, in the light of this principle, can a church, or a body of churches, presume to bar the great body of disciples, *equally* owned and blessed of God, from the table of our Lord ? Is not a yoke laid upon the necks of believers, when something is made a condition of sacramental communion which God does not require or regard ? But, it may be asked, would you apply the same principle to unevangelical denominations ?

Most assuredly. When God bears them witness by the gift of His Spirit, putting no difference between them and us, who are we that we should reply against God ? Are we wiser than He ? Can we order His churches better than He ? But pause : When and where has God borne them witness ? Where has He, ever in the history of the world, honored a sect fundamentally wrong with his blessing ? Did ever a local church, unevangelical in faith, have, from any cause, a revival of religion, without changing its creed back to the doctrines of the Gospel ? We know a church that lapsed from the faith, and soon became almost extinct. Peculiar circumstances at length led it to settle an orthodox minister, whose labors were blessed in due time with a genuine revival. What was the result ? The church returned to its former creed, in which it still

* Acts xv. 10.

abides. So must it ever be. It is because we believe that God does not and can not, without denying Himself, bear them witness, that we hold no Christian fellowship with those who deny the fundamental doctrines.

Should it be replied that the invitation to the Lord's Table is restricted on other grounds, then we would emphatically deny the right of any church to set aside or to neglect a principle, like that we have quoted, for those grounds. We can not employ this principle in determining whom we will exchange pulpits with, and with whom we will join in union meetings and societies, as we do; and then supersede it when determining whom we shall invite to the Lord's Table, unless the Lord has expressly excepted the mode of baptism, or the question of psalms and hymns, or whatever other grounds there may be, from the operation of this principle. This, we presume, is claimed by no one to be the case. Therefore, we conclude that the law stated by Peter, applies to the question in hand. On this divine principle, we claim, as it seems to us conclusively, that the invitation to the Lord's Supper should not be limited by non-essential requirements to one particular denomination; but should be as broad as the churches owned of God as His. And, if the invitation should not be limited thus to the members of any one denomination, much less should it to the members of one local church. The clear witness of the Spirit is far wider than either limit.

Our argument can not be evaded by the plea that the controversy at Antioch respected salvation, while that between the immersionists and ourselves respects only church privileges; for, if the principle cited was deemed by inspired apostles sufficient to settle the greater question, most surely it is sufficient to settle the smaller. The applicability of a principle in settling any point, does not depend upon the greatness of the issues involved, but upon the nature of the case.

We rejoice that this principle, so long overlooked, is re-asserting itself, and bringing the churches of Christ together as one in sympathy and fellowship; and the danger now lies, if danger there be, in a rebound from too great closeness to too great looseness, symptoms of which are already apparent.

Therefore, we pass to the other side, and consider more at length some reasons why the invitation to the Lord's Table should not be extended beyond the limits of the evangelical churches.

It is urged by some, in favor of a wider invitation, "that the church is a human organization, and has the liberty to extend its hospitality at its own pleasure." If this means that the church is composed of men and women, the proposition is true, but it proves nothing. If, however, it means, as we suppose it is intended to mean, that the church rests on human authority, and possesses the prerogatives of a human organization, like Masonry, or a debating club, then we deny both the asserted fact, and the logical inference sought to be drawn from it.

That there was a church, with its rites and ritual, under the Mosaic dispensation, is beyond dispute. Christ Jesus was a dutiful member of it. This church was instituted formally by God in the covenant which He made with Abraham, and in the moral and ceremonial law which He gave in the midst of the thunders of Sinai. Did this divine institution give place at the crucifixion, to a human organization? Where, then, is the glory of the Gospel dispensation? Did Christ intrust His great commission to a mere human instrumentality? The improbability of His substituting a human organization for a divinely-instituted church becomes an impossibility in the light of His own words and acts. He said to Peter: "Upon this rock I will build my church." He could not here have referred to the church the veil of whose temple was rent from the top to the bottom at His crucifixion, for He speaks of a future act; He calls the church His, — "my church," — and declares that "*the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*" Surely, He could not have said this of any human organization. *He also expressly intrusts discipline to "the church."** That this church was not the Jewish synagogue, but the church which He was soon to build, and which should be called His, is proved by the promise He made it: "For where two or three are

* Matt. xviii., 15-18.

gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." * Is Christ thus present in any merely human organization? He instituted the Supper, and said: "This in remembrance of me." The Supper is a rite, a sacrament; in what? — a human or a divine organization? He sent His apostles to preach the gospel, and they, divinely directed, established churches, called "the churches of God," "the churches of Christ," "the body of Christ," in the midst of which He walks. We marvel that any one, with such statements before him, should call the church a human organization. But this is not all. *The churches have not the prerogatives of human organizations.* They can not alter, suspend, or annul their fundamental law, the Bible; they can not change the corner-stone on which they are built, or the end for which they are established, — things fully within the power of any human organization. Thus, in origin and in prerogatives, the churches differ radically from any human organization.

Now, by the terms of their unalterable law, the churches are expressly limited in membership to a peculiar class, called saints, believers, the renewed, the baptized. The proof is conclusive: the test of discipleship; the oft-repeated requirement of love, faith and repentance; the right and duty of discipline; the express exclusion of certain sinners; the description of the church as holy, the salt of the earth, the light of the world; its mission; the warnings against corruption and apostacy; — all restrain the church from admitting to membership whom they will. By their fundamental law, which they can neither amend nor annul, only those regenerated by the Holy Ghost can become members in full communion of the churches of Christ. Since the labors of President Edwards, probably no one will directly advocate the opening of the churches to the unconverted. It is now admitted that the Bible requires, as the condition of membership, more than a life not scandalous. What cost Edwards so dearly has become a perpetual blessing to the churches. The incisive words of the Master ever apply: "He that is not with me, is against me."

* Matt. xviii., 20.

The churches being thus composed of the faithful and governed by a permanent law as their rule of faith and practice, on whom rests the responsibility of preserving their purity? of keeping from their peculiar privileges, the unworthy? Does the responsibility rest on the churches, or on the individual desiring church privileges? Must a church admit to its privileges whoever desires to enjoy them, asking no questions? or has it the right to interpose certain conditions which, guided by the Scriptures, it holds to be essential to its purity? Here, if we mistake not, hangs the issue between the common and a more liberal form of invitation to the Lord's Table. The question must, therefore, be answered. It is rendered extremely improbable that the responsibility rests with the individual, and not with the church, by the fact that Christ and His apostles so repeatedly warned the churches against false prophets and anti-Christ's; by the fact that they were to judge men by their fruits, and were to try the spirits; and by the fact that the churches are required to discipline the disorderly, and excommunicate the incorrigible. But Christ did not leave us to infer where the responsibility rests; *He expressly laid it upon the churches*, from which no one can remove it. Between the rule of church discipline and His promise to be in the churches, using an emphatic form of address, Christ said: "Verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." *

"Plainly, the *ye* must be held parallel with the *church* in the foregoing verse, so that the sure and binding nature of the church's decision is here affirmed." Thus, the particular church is empowered by this solemn declaration to act as God's agent in the discipline of its members. Nor is this all. By the use of the word *whatsoever*, Christ makes His promise of ratification wider than the rule of discipline, and inclusive of all done by the church in obedience to His revealed will. Thus, Christ's churches, instituted by Himself, and denied the

* Matt. xviii., 18.

prerogatives of human organizations, do, within certain limits, receive a divine ratification of their doings.

In addition to church discipline, what guards of purity, what limits of fellowship, are laid by their organic law upon the churches to enforce? Having the power of the keys, to whom shall they open, and against whom shall they shut? If there be such limits and guards, the churches are bound, as we have already shown, to observe them. They can not disregard them at pleasure, or without sin. Convinced that principles and rules have been given, to guide the churches in this as in all other points, we call upon believers to re-examine the law and rule of their faith and practice, respecting the latitude of Christian fellowship, lest the evils of the past come upon the churches again. Duly appreciating the kindly feelings of those who would invite to the Lord's Table all who believe themselves to be the followers of Jesus Christ, we would imitate them, did not our interpretation of the Master's words forbid.

Only those who are new creatures in Christ Jesus are fit for membership in the Christian church. This is fundamental. But, is it to be presumed that all whose conduct is not scandalous are new creatures in Christ Jesus, and are therefore fit for the church? or must the applicant give evidence of being a true disciple? The practice of admitting to full communion on presumption and not on evidence, finds, we believe, no warrant in the New Testament. Presumption must give place to *evidence*, and evidence too which in the eye of charity satisfies the requirements of the Divine law. The believer must confess with the mouth the Lord Jesus, and be baptized into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. *The Church*, in the exercise of the authority vested in it, *must pass upon the confession*, and perform the baptism. But, admitting this, are the confession and baptism prerequisites to the Lord's Table? Looking at the commands, statements, and examples given for our guidance, we affirm that the rule is, confession before baptism, and baptism before the Eucharist. The great commission of our ascending Lord to

His churches, joins baptism with the discipling of all nations: as though the first thing is to make disciples; the next, is to baptize them. So Peter, in his Pentecostal sermon, makes baptism the next duty after repentance. Believers, indeed, are designated as the baptized.* Examples, too, are given in the Acts, showing that baptism in practice, followed as the next duty after belief. So clear has this relation of baptism to belief been made by the Scriptures that "Christians of every name, from the apostolic age to the present, with hardly a dissentient voice, have declared baptism to be a prerequisite to the Eucharist." "Uniting with a local church is, therefore, the immediate sequence and, as it were, the natural counterpart of a baptismal vow." "In no case is the Lord's Supper put before baptism; in no case does the narrative recognize any interval between faith and baptism, to be filled by the Lord's Supper; in no case are believers brought into the church, and afterwards baptized."†

If exceptions should ever be necessary, the rule that only baptized believers are permitted by the Scriptures to come to the Lord's Table, stands firm. To found a rule on exceptions, is preposterous; to override the divine order that those who neglect or refuse to join the church may enjoy church privileges, is to abet disobedience in fact, if not in intention. To invite to the Lord's Table non-church members, even though they may believe and we may hope they are the followers of Christ, mistaken as to duty, runs counter to the word and will of God as interpreted by the almost universal practice of the churches in all ages. Instead of fostering the disobedience of such, the Church should say, as God has said to them, "Repent and be baptized every one you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins." So long as they neglect this duty, we can not admit them to the Lord's Table without confirming, extending, and perpetuating their sin. If they have been baptized in infancy, then they must ratify the act of their parents by a public confession of Christ. Even the dying can

* Rom. vi. 3; 1. Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 27.

† 1 Bib. Sacra., vol. xix., pp. 145, 151, 153.

receive baptism before the bread and the wine. The possible exceptions are, therefore, rare, and can not invalidate the rule. No wrong is done by this rule to believers outside the local church, for such believers have no business to be out of the Church of Christ. Their place is in the visible Church, where all its blessings and burdens are theirs.

There are, however, organizations calling themselves Christian churches, whose members we must also exclude from our invitation to the Lord's Table, even though some of them may, in the eye of charity, be regarded as born of the Spirit. That there are bodies professing to be Christian which deny the Lord Jesus, reject whatever they please of the Scriptures, obliterate the distinction between saint and sinner, is painfully evident. One, not in full sympathy, but yet in fellowship with them, has recently said, "There are many amongst us who would say, 'I had rather go to hell with Emerson and Abbot than to heaven with any who would shut them out; *because theirs is the better spirit.*'" * Can we invite such to the table of Him who said, "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him," on the ground that they believe themselves to be followers of Jesus Christ, or on any other grounds? They claim most loudly to be Christians, though Abbot has renounced the name, they are members of so-called Christian churches; but can we recognize them as such by our invitation of them to the Lord's Table? It is healthful, in these days of fading distinctions, to revert to a more wholesome course. Errorists threatened the foundations and the peace of the primitive churches, and the apostles have taught us how to treat them. To churches troubled by them, Paul wrote, "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." † And, to give it emphasis, the solemn adjuration is repeated. To another church he wrote, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be *anathema maran-atha*," ‡ i.e., "let him be

* Rev. James W. Thompson, D.D., in *Monthly Review and Religious Magazine*.

† Gal. i. 8, 9.

‡ 1 Cor. xvi. 22.

accursed when the Lord cometh." To another, "Now we command you in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, *and not after the tradition which he received from us.*"* After describing those "having the form of godliness, but denying the form thereof," he said to a minister of the gospel, "From such turn away."† To another minister, "A man that is an heretic, after a first and second admonition, shun; knowing that he that is such is perverted, and sinneth, being self-condemned."‡ John, writing to the "elect lady," is still more specific, saying, "Whosoever transgresseth (progresseth), and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not God. He that abideth in the doctrine of Christ, he hath both the Father and the Son. If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed. For he that biddeth him God speed is partaker of his evil deeds."§

These surely are not the words of men who saw no practical difference between truth and error, the doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of anti-Christ. The claims of errorists to be the followers of Christ are stoutly denied; and they are to be judged or tested not only by the churches, but also by the ministers, and not only by the ministers, but also by the membership, by believing women; and the criterion by which these are to judge them, is the gospel, the doctrine of Christ. After these pointed and specific admonitions, did the primitive churches invite errorists to the Lord's Table? But, it may be asserted that the churches have advanced to more liberal views and call for more liberal measures than were necessary then. John had these progressionists in prophetic view when he wrote; for he said, according to the best established reading, "Every one that progresseth, and abideth not in the doctrine (of Christ), hath not God." "The doctrine is that which Christ himself brought and taught, and caused to be propagated by His apostles." The word "progresseth" indi-

* 2 Thes. iii. 6. See also vs. 14, 15.

† 2 Tim. iii. 5.

‡ Titus iii. iv. xi. (Ellicott.)

§ 2 John, ix, xi.

374 *Whom Shall we Invite to the Lord's Supper?* [July,

cates just such a progress beyond the truth, a reaching after something beyond the limits of Christian doctrine, as has been witnessed in these days of progress. But, in religious things, "true progress is only possible in the maintenance and on the foundation of Christian truth."

But who shall decide what is progress in the truth, and what progress is a departure from the truth? As shown, the apostles laid the responsibility on the churches, on ministers, and on individual believers; but upon them severally in their respective modes of fellowship. We have the same doctrines by which to judge that they had; the light in which we live is greater than theirs; science does not obliterate the distinction between truth and error, right and wrong. We are, therefore, able to judge, as well as they were; yea, better; for, in the lapse of time, we reach a clearer argument from the witness of the Spirit than was possible in the first century. We must, then, in obedience to our only infallible rule of faith and practice, draw the line firmly between those who hold the doctrine of Christ which the Scriptures teach, and those who accept and reject what they please of it; between those who progress in the truth, and those who go beyond it; between those who preach Christ's gospel, and those who proclaim another gospel. This duty, however painful it may be, the churches can not neglect, without denying the Lord that bought them. Now those churches which abide in the doctrine of Christ receive, as we believe, the witness of the Spirit, and are called evangelical; while those who reject that doctrine do not, as we believe, receive the witness of the Spirit, and are called unevangelical. If, therefore, the former be invited to the Lord's Table, and the latter be excluded, the line will be drawn just where the Scriptures draw it, just where the Holy Spirit draws it, and must be in accordance with the Divine will. We can not invite unevangelical churches to our holy communion without bidding them God speed, and becoming partakers of their evil deeds. If this be illiberality, it is, we believe, no more illiberal than the truth. "True liberality in any sense of the word which makes it a

virtue, is not that easy, good nature which is equally hospitable to truth and error, to faith and the negation of faith. Such hospitality can not co-exist with intensity of conviction; and, instead of indicating advanced thought, as is its boast, is evidence of a backward movement towards that amiable Pyrrhonism which holds nothing settled but its own tranquillity, or that Roman politeness which assigns a niche or a pedestal to any god whom any people may wish to set up in its Pantheon." *

We truly sympathize with that brave band who are trying, despite discouragements, to find protection for their churches "against the crowd of skeptical, disorganizing, and otherwise unworthy teachers, that is now drifting towards (them) from all sects and all forms of belief and unbelief"; but we can not suggest a better way than that of the apostles, rigidly enforced. For if we depart from our fundamental law in one point, who can prevent our mounting at last a "platform of *feeble neutrality* between Christianity and its opponents," or even of downright hostility to the gospel?

ARTICLE IV.

MARY LYON: HER FAITH AND HER WORKS.

Amid all the varying estimates in this world of incongruities, in which each man and woman claims the right to judge from his or her own particular stand-point, it is consoling to know that there *are* acts which belong with the eternal verities; having a far-reaching, a holy influence, not only away on into generations to come, but into that existence which is yet to be. We call that influence moral power.

Such was Mary Lyon's. One woman, without wealth, influential family, or social advantages of any kind, made herself felt not only over New England but in the far West and in

* Rev. James W. Thompson, D.D., in *Mon. Rev. and Relig. Mag.*

missionary lands; is still felt, though more than twenty years have gone by since her death; and will be, through those brought under her training, on through endless life.

Her work was two-fold, but may be summed up in this general statement; to discipline her pupils for the service of Christ; not only to make educated, but educated Christian women. The spirit of her aim is concisely set forth in a few words to one of her assistants: "We want disciplined mind, if we can have it on the side of Christ. We want our susceptibilities enlarged and increased, if it may be for usefulness and happiness here and in heaven. * * * We want our leading women to be Christian women, strong in principle, efficient in duty; and then the more of solid acquisitions and elegant accomplishments the better."

She appears before us as the founder of a school, and as a revivalist—this word is used because no other will fill its place. In both she was singularly successful, and the causes of success are the same in both.

It has been intimated that she had by birth and family no position, as the world would judge. Her inheritance was such a one as the pious soul of old Dr. Goodell so gloried in. She, like him, descended from those who were children of the Great King, whose names "were on the catalogue of princes, as of those who live forever." In looking for the causes of those mighty results of her labors, we must begin just there. So far back as she could learn anything about them, her ancestors were persons of piety, such as gave New England its religious character. Faith in God formed the solid foundation on which they builded. She was their worthy representative; faith in God was the basis on which her character was established and her life-work wrought.

Her whole early life was a preparation for the more special business of her later years, and all circumstances had a use in helping to make her the woman she became; even those which at first seemed adverse. The homely ways of her mother's house, the habits of industry from necessity learned and practiced, the frugal fare, the hardy life so much out of doors, the

lessons of honest independence, all aided in developing in this extraordinary woman strength, energy, patience, perseverance, and those many other traits which go to make up a character brave, broad, and enduring. And the struggle for an education, the intense application, the self-denial, and the persistence in overcoming obstacles, contributed their part.

Being fully persuaded of the importance of a school which should have for its great aim just what she put into such a significant statement as has been already quoted, she gave herself wholly to its accomplishment. How she gained experience in the several schools she was engaged in, previous to the one which was so especially her own, and which can never be dissociated from her name; how she succeeded at length in establishing that, getting it thoroughly organized and into systematic working order, and providing, so far as was possible, for its perpetual life, belongs to the history of persevering effort.

In the beginning she held it to be a work for God. *That* was the central truth. The plan was based on that. It would not have been begun at all on any other terms. Possessed, then, with this great idea, she believed in His help just as naturally as she believed in human agency; that His hand would be just as manifest as the hand that used the plane or trowel; and so feeling, what less could she do than go to Him as one would to a personal friend? God was no abstract Being to her, but one whom she could speak to and hear from. God was as real to her as her own father. She needed counsel, and she went to Him; she was perplexed, and she made it known to Him. He whom the heaven of heavens can not contain, was found by her, inside her closet when she shut the door and pronounced His name: though no voice was audible in the stillness, she knew that He spoke to her. She waited the issue of events which she had committed to Him. Sometimes her plans were furthered, sometimes retarded; in either case she discerned the Lord. He carried the work surely on: others saw His hand in it; they would have been blind *not* to have seen it; and yet no miracle was

wrought. *She acted upon her faith.* If the expression may be allowed, she *believed* in her faith.

She did not look for any marvellous signs; nor did she purpose to remain inactive herself while He wrought for her. She did her utmost, for her soul was in it. And this devotion and self-denial she wished her pupils to be animated by. In laying out the plan, she says,—and what teacher ever made a grander or wiser statement of her purpose than this?—“Great care is taken to present points of attraction to those who would gladly become benevolent, self-denying teachers, should the cause of Christ demand it, and points of repulsion to the more inefficient and self-indulgent, and to those whose views and desires are bounded by themselves and their own family circle.” In no summary of its advantages is one word said of manners or accomplishments. She was too intent in looking after the roots of things, seeing that they struck deep, held firm, and produced vigorous growths, to care for the grace and beauty of foliage and flower. No doubt she was too disregarding in this respect; but the one essential idea so absorbed her that there was no room for minor things; and if questioned, she would have pointed to the New Testament as a perfect guide for forming manners, and there left the matter forever.

The Mount Holyoke school went into operation; the funds having been raised and the foundations laid on Christian principles, having been solemnly dedicated to the Lord, as His own institution, where from day to day the precepts and spirit of the Gospel should be illustrated, where it was hoped souls would be born into His service, and where much should be done for maturing and elevating Christian character.

Soon there was evidence of His blessing, and thenceforth, through the whole of Miss Lyon's life, (with its subsequent, continued prosperity the present article has not to do,) it was remarkable for revivals, as previous schools of hers had likewise been. While at the head of that seminary she had a part in eleven; being about one a year, in which most of her pupils became subjects of the new life. It was a thing almost

to be relied upon, that the majority of those who went there would be converted. And yet there was no extraordinary demonstration externally during those seasons of so great moral change. On the contrary, she herself said that a visitor would have observed but little differing from the customary condition of the school, with so slight outward manifestation did the powerful work go on. Such being the case, we are not surprised to learn that it was characterized by apparent thoroughness, and that there was not much danger of deception or reaction.

The question naturally arises, what agency had Miss Lyon in these movements? Was there something about *her* which aroused her pupils, and then carried them along by the mere force of sympathy?

If she had been of a frail physical organization, with whose varying states a highly-wrought nervous temperament constantly acted, we should look for some extreme developments of spiritual life, and expect a kind of magnetic power to be in active exercise at those times of excited feeling. There are those of such fine, intensely-alive, easily-vibrating nerves that the soul within them is quick in response as electric fluid; and they are themselves strangely controlled by a subtle something which they can no more understand than they can resist; and this power also thrills others, and takes them captive for the time. In such, an ecstasy from mere sensation, or quickened sensibilities, soon to be succeeded by lassitude and dejection, might readily be mistaken for newly-kindled, spiritual fire. It is not uncommon to find in Christians of impulsive natures states of very great exaltation of religious feeling, where unwonted fervor is imparted to them—a blaze of enthusiasm which runs, like living fire, from heart to heart. It is like lightning, swift and mysterious; like a mountain torrent, sweeping everything along with its current. This is possible of a true, as well as of a mistaken piety, in the earnest and warm-hearted; and no doubt in God's varied plans for the exercise of human agency and human talent in His service, this is to be reckoned as helpful, since these impressible souls were never given by Him without a purpose.

But in accounting for her influence, we can fall back upon nothing of this kind. Her great heart and masculine understanding had for their mortal tabernacle a remarkably vigorous and substantial body. Both physical and mental constitution were of the healthiest and the hardest. Rugged strength was as much the characteristic of the one, as sound sense of the other; regular, calm action was the rule of both. She was not a woman of impulse, as we generally understand it. God gave her a simple, well-balanced mind and an equable temperament. She was not the sport of caprice or temper; her feelings were to a very uncommon degree under her control: principle, not passion, guided her actions. She had clear judgment, steady nerves, a tranquil heart, and was mistress of herself and the occasion. It was this very evenness and poise, this simplicity and plainness, this absence of startling development, which made her the powerful woman she was. There was reserved strength back of all that was apparent. She was a pillar of endurance, always to be relied upon for support. One of fitful moods could never have been the soul to trust in, through doubtful days, as she was. Her steadfast spirit shone through her honest, homely face, and gave assurance to the timid and the wavering. Patient, constant, sure, beyond most, it can never be suspected of her that an influence could be gained by any spasmodic action.

It is almost superfluous to add that she could not have been a visionary, so wrapt in heavenly happiness as to lose sight of earthly needs. She was thoroughly practical; not in any sense imaginative; not given in the slightest degree to fanaticism. She saw everything in its plain, every-day aspect; hardly having the power to invest the "common and the familiar" with beauty such as the hand of genius can throw around even the homeliest life. This amounted almost to a deficiency in her. Nothing in her published letters shows the faculty even in moderation. In expression, her appeals are straight-forward, directly to the point, with no graces of rhetoric whatever—a clear, plain statement which, however, gave an excellency of its own to her style, a certain vigor and

force by which her convictions naturally and readily expressed themselves. Anything beyond the unadorned necessities entered not into her arrangement. But in enforcing upon her pupils the momentous import of the Divine doctrines of the necessity of repentance and regeneration through the blood of Christ, she kindled as on no other subject; and her own most intense belief in them, her deep sense of individual need and accountability, bore her along in thrilling entreaty that rose almost to eloquence.

It was not by personal presence, by the charm of beauty, or by that grace of manner, which, whether native to a woman or cultivated to the highest degree of art, often amounts to positive fascination. She had nothing of this: her bearing was just what we should look for in one like her; she was unconscious of herself, filled with the thoughts which occupied all her life; regardless to a defect of the minor accomplishments; of a plain, though in its way, striking and attractive countenance; ungraceful in form and movement; careless about dress; destitute of drawing-room polish or courtesies.

Yet here she was, a potent soul, shaping the character of hundreds, leading them with a sure hand into the higher life. And the power was simpler than anything that has been named; it was that of a devout soul waiting on God, inquiring of Him, and *doing His pleasure*.

God works by means. So Miss Lyon prepared the way for the coming of the Lord. She was "willing," nay, more than "willing in the day of His power." She was ready and looking for Him. She not only made use of a systematic course of religious instruction, and constantly kept their chief interest before the minds of her scholars, but she endeavored to see that nothing in herself or the teachers should stand in the way of a blessing. The spirit of self-sacrifice, of humility, and thanksgiving pervades her letters as it did her life. She knew the condition of every individual of the school, because her deep concern for them made her acquaint herself with the truth. No one felt more deeply the tremendous importance of laying the foundations of the character in Christ. No one

knew better the value of a Christian training and personal piety. She felt it to the core of her heart as she looked upon all those young girls standing upon the threshold of womanhood. What preparation had they for the unknown future? To meet all that lay before them they needed the steadfast trust, the absolute, unfearing security which are to be found in Christ alone. Not one of those under her charge was she willing to commit to the world beyond those peaceful walls, without feeling with some degree of certainty that she possessed, through regeneration and faith in Christ, that which alone would secure her true safety and peace. She was not willing that one should go forth except as strengthened by Christian principles, and by them fitted to be a blessing in whatever place she might be called upon to fill. The sense of this so weighed upon her that she frequently, as opportunity offered, gave herself up for a day or week to prayer and the most earnest meditation.

With many people what they imagine to be meditation is reverie, a dreamy musing, fruitless of result. To her disciplined mind it was a very different process, a systematic investigation of causes and results, of needs and the best way to meet them, a careful looking over of the past, a faithful inquiring of God. In her self-enforced solitude, she was in communication with that Spirit which imparts wisdom to those who ask. She knew from long experience that such communion would be hers, if she desired it. It lay with her wholly. She had only to ask. Can anything be simpler than this wonderful, this almost inconceivable truth? He comes to the soul that wants Him. He is more willing to come, than we to ask; more ready to grant our petitions, than we to make them known. Only the condition is that we must feel our want, must believe in His nearness and power, and must with singleness of soul approach Him. The soul must enter into the inmost depths of its retirement, and close the door upon all inferior interests. There must be—O, solemn necessity!—a putting away of secret sin. “If I regard iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me.” How the

words narrow a man down to the austere honesty in His sight!

Miss Lyon had such a feeling as this. She asked anxiously: "What is there in *me* to hinder my prayers for the school?" It will probably be found that the seasons of peculiar blessing to the school, were preceded by healthful but rigorous self-examination. And it will readily be believed that few ever went to Him with a spirit more free from selfish motives than she. Those who knew her best were not aware of any personal ambition in her; if it existed they did not discover it. She was believed to be free from it. So far as human judgment could determine, the purpose which controlled her life was the advancement of the kingdom of Christ on earth, personal holiness, and the true good of others. But she helped herself in the higher life by doing the greater work beyond self; so that in one sense, self may be said to have been left wholly out of her arrangements, while by that fine spiritual law, which Christ's nearest friends understand best, she received in her own soul a hundred fold for that which she imparted. The very preparation to meet the King to whom she bore such large petitions for others, brought joy into her own life. She went before Him in such a meek and self-distrustful way—knowing it was such a presumptuous thing to ask so great a favor as the conversion of a soul with a heart pre-occupied, or seeking its own honor—is it any longer a marvel that she received the most gracious answer and the most ample gifts? She went thoughtfully and reverently; she went with repentance in that she had not always done His will; with a little child's confidence that all was His to give; and with her whole heart of love to him and to those she wished to entrust to Him.

Looking over her remarkable life, seeing what she did, and what manner of spirit she was of, how believing she was, we can say of her more truly than of almost any other: "O, woman, great was thy faith!" And then we can understand why so peculiarly to her, were almost verified those other divine words: "Be it unto thee even as thou wilt."

ARTICLE V.

THE RELATION OF LEGISLATION TO MORAL SUASION, IN
THE TEMPERANCE REFORM.

In the work of reform the word of God appeals to the heart, and demands a new life there, while the civil law can only go so far as to enforce some rules of outward conduct. Human legislation can not enter the drunkard's soul to destroy his depraved disposition, nor into the secret of his physical life to overcome his vicious thirst; but it can put the decanter out of sight, so that his strange thirst may not be provoked by the public display of strong drink.

It will be seen that the power of the civil law lies in its negative method. It can not command a change of the bad passions, but it can remove those objects which feed and stimulate them. Its function thus to maintain social order and true liberty, by removing the sources of needless temptation, has no narrower limit than the measure of moral virtue in society to enact and then to enforce it. Such legislation is consistent with true liberty. The motto of sound democracy is said to be, "the greatest possible good to the greatest possible number"; but the free sale of ardent spirits is in result, pecuniary privilege to the few, and destruction to the many. If on the assertion that a man has the right to drink what, and as much as he pleases, the civil law allows the place of indiscriminate sale; then all who live near that place must endure the general nuisance caused by it; the peaceable citizen must be disturbed by night riots, pay taxes to support the drinker and his family, when strong drink has made them paupers, and bear the outrages of the crime thus turned loose upon society. Innocent and defenseless women must suffer abuse; children must be brutally treated, and their ambition to become respectable broken down, with the prospect that families and individuals, otherwise established in virtue and happiness, will be

constantly lured to destruction. It will be seen that this assertion of the right to drink tramples under foot the rights of the many who do not drink, and is therefore but the tyranny of the few. The civil law which undertakes to maintain such a claim is not democratic, but despotic.

Thus, there are two agents in moral reform ; first, the word of God, which is made known through private study, Sabbath-schools, and preaching, so that its truth reaches the popular mind and heart in the attitude of moral suasion. Thereby a moral sentiment is produced in favor of reform. When this sentiment has been received by the majority, then it can pass into the civil law, and that law will have more or less of force according as the moral sentiment on which it rests prevails. A law that is sustained only by a bare majority, can not have much practical force ; while if sustained by three-fourths of the community, the law becomes efficient as the second agent in moral reform. Law serves to keep whatever moral suasion may have won. When moral suasion has rolled on the wheel of progress in temperance, the civil law is the latch which legislation drops into the wheel to hold it. Moral suasion applies the truth, through its various instruments of instruction, to the heart and will of the people, in such a way as to persuade them to do well of their own accord, and in this way plants the seeds of temperance, and the civil law builds a fence around these seeds, to protect them that they may grow without molestation. Moral suasion works inwardly in the heart to reform, but law works outside to put down riot and to restrain those who are so perverse that they will not reform themselves, and who do all they can to prevent reform in others.

It appears, therefore, that legislation can not take the lead : it can not enforce anything better than the popular sentiment. It requires greater force of moral sentiment among the people to secure the enforcement of any temperance legislation, than it does to secure the legislation. No matter how good the law enacted, it would fail of being executed, if better than popular opinion would warrant. In a legislature, temperance men

may be in the minority, and yet as a third party they may effect such a combination with another party as to secure the passage of a stringent temperance law. In point of both theory and fact this law may be none too stringent, and yet being so far in advance of the popular sentiment that it can not be enforced, the result is free rum. Such legislation is worthless. A law less stringent, so as not to advance beyond the popular sentiment, and therefore sure of being enforced, is practically better than a more perfect piece of legislation which, however, can not be put to use.

On the other hand, it is eminently important that legislation should advance just as far as the popular sentiment will allow, just so far as its enforcement can be secured. There is no safety to public morals, unless the moral sentiment of the people is expressed in forms of law, just so fast and so far as that sentiment advances. A church may erect a most attractive house of worship, call to the pulpit the best talent and piety, and fill the pews with the best people, but little could be done thereby for the morals of the community in general if opposite this church a gin palace should be opened, with rooms for gambling, and the street left free for open vice, and no Sabbath laws to secure an abatement of the public nuisance. Though the number at first opposed to good morals should be small, yet, without the restraint of law, they would have it in their power to tempt multitudes to ruin, and this power of temptation would increase till the body of society would become corrupt.

It is a nice point, therefore, to hold legislation in the proper relation to moral suasion, so that its movement shall be neither too fast nor too slow. Hence no subject of legislation requires sounder judgment, or more skill of statesmanship, than the subject of morals. The opinion seems to prevail in certain quarters, that the civil law should demand nothing less than what is up to the highest level of theoretic truth; that it should be set up as an exact standard of perfect right in a case of morals, with penalty appropriate. For example: it has been said that a temperance law that should allow the sale of

alcohol for medicinal use and the arts, with the heaviest of penalties upon conviction of sale for other uses, would be a perfect law. But though it should be made to appear upon the clearest reasoning, that such a law were none too stringent to meet the intrinsic merits of the case; though it be shown that he who sells his neighbor drink to make him a drunkard, and makes him so, is guilty of murder by indirect means always, and by direct means sometimes, and that the offense is such in its effect upon others than the one against whom it is committed, that it grows to be a crime of multiplied murder; yet it would be useless to put such a law in the book of statutes, so long as the prevailing sentiment should attach nothing criminal to such sale. By degrees the public sentiment may be carried forward in that direction with progressive enactments of law to suit the growing sentiment, until the most stringent law is thus safely reached; but that high point can not be reached by a single step of legislation. We may freely concede the educating power even of laws not fully executed; but when the law so far outruns the public sentiment as to be a dead letter, not only does that educating influence wholly fail, but a positive habit of lawlessness is generated in the community.

The great need in popular opinion on the subject of temperance, is a greater reverence for divine law as revealed in the word of God, in order to form upon that a proper statute. Where there is no reverence for the divine government, there will be no respect for human authority. Let the popular estimate of justice be so low as to reduce the penalty affixed to the greatest crimes to the smallest amount, do away with capital punishment for murder, excuse the thief, especially if he steal largely, on the ground of kleptomania; let the plea of insanity in the courts become the successful defense for all the worst forms of crime, and then, of course, it will be vain to attempt an exception in the single case of temperance, by enacting a law with a stringent penalty. Let there prevail in the body politic a false notion of mercy as a doctrine of Christianity; let the attribute of mercy in God be held so that,

instead of granting forgiveness to penitent souls, it shall grant universal amnesty to all forms of sin, whether repented of or not, and the result will be that this false notion of mercy will proportionately destroy the power of the civil law in that community in proportion. Let false notions of humanity be current,—a humanity of sentimentalism that weeps only over the sufferings of convicts,—and the distinction between right and wrong is so far ignored as to weaken all law. The drift of this false sentimentalism in morals, and of the so-called humanitarianism in religion, is to put disabilities in the way of virtue, and to soothe and flatter vice. To eradicate this poison, and purify public opinion so that it may enact and enforce right law upon temperance, it is necessary that a deeper impression should be made with the word of God. It must be understood more generally that civil law can have no sanction and firm support but that which it receives from the Divine. They who first set aside the law and righteousness of God, and then assume to set up a law and righteousness of their own, only hew out the “broken cisterns” that can hold no water. The moral sanctions of human law are from a supernatural source. Hence, in order to a sound temperance platform, it must be maintained that, as Divine truth leads the way in the introduction of Christian civilization among a heathen people, thus forming at length the right foundation for civil law; so ever after, in all the further progress that this civilization can make among any people, Divine truth must lead, working by moral suasion, and this lead the civil law, with its institutions, must follow, binding all with the statute; while, for the constant improvement of legislation, and greater efficiency of law, there must always be sought in advance of it a higher tone of the popular moral sentiment.

THE HOHENZOLLERNS.*

In Swabia, between the Donau and the Necker, stood an old mountain castle, the ancestral home of the Counts of Hohenzollern. A branch of this house appears in the thirteenth century, as Burgraves of Nuremberg, a people knowing well how to make money, and quite as well, how to use it in acquiring influence. On account of their extensive domains and distinguished services, Charles IV., Emperor of Germany, bestowed on them the honor of Princes of the Empire, and their lands, rich in means, were divided into two principalities: on the mountains and under the mountains. In 1411, the Burgrave, Frederick VI., received for valued services in the election of the Emperor Sigismund, the governorship of the district of Brandenburg, which secured to him all the revenue and power of a complete land-holder, the Emperor reserving to himself and heirs, only the dignity of Elector in said district. But, as Sigismund wanted money and other forms of help which the shrewd Frederick could lend, he subsequently mortgaged the Electorate also; and at length, finding it easier to bestow titles than to refund money, he conveyed by deed, the Electorate, making it sure and strong. Thus the Hohenzollern Prince purchased a permanent footing in the district, and as Elector, assumed the title of Frederick I. At this time John Huss was culminating to martyrdom in Bohemia, and the new Elector labored both with Huss and the Emperor to bring matters to a quiet issue: advising Huss to rely simply upon the Word for the support of his cause, and counseling the Emperor to mildness, all, however, without effect. At the death of Sigismund the princes of the empire looked towards Frederick as successor, while he, faithful in his allegiance, guided the choice in favor of Albert II., of Austria, son-in-law of the Emperor.

*LEHRBUCH DER WELTGESCHICHTE. Von Friederich Nösselt; and
LEITFADEN DER VATERLÄNDISCHER GESCHICHTE. Von Ludwig Hahn.

Frederick II., surnamed the Irontooth, succeeded his father in 1440. Of firm faith in God, naturally mild, but resolute in purpose, the Irontooth addressed himself firmly to reduce the rude people of his district to order. When they opposed his entrance as ruler into Cologne and Berlin, the two cities which have since blended into Berlin, he took advantage of an internal quarrel, to march in at the head of six thousand knights, fortified himself, and built the first installment of the old palace as the headquarters of a permanent capital. In 1470 Frederick II. abdicated in favor of his brother, Albert Achilles, who well merited his surname, and ordained as a law of the house, that the Brandenburg district, with all its appurtenances, should fall duly and undirected to the oldest son, or his heirs. In accordance with this ordinance, his son John Cicero succeeded in 1486, and was the first Hohenzollern who permanently resided in the district. Prematurely developed, this Elector commenced his rule at fifteen years of age. Of a firm will, and watchful for the good of his people, John led an earnest mode of life, and established a Supreme Court of Judicature, which he earnestly counselled to judge impartially, to avoid all useless formalities, and above all, to seek the means of amicable adjustment.

In 1499 Joachim succeeded his father. When his brother Albert, Archbishop of Magdeburg, had bestowed on the notorious Tetzl the right to sell indulgences, and received a part of the gains, and Luther came out in scathing opposition to this infamous swindle, Joachim sympathized with his brother, was angry that a monk should assail such ecclesiastical dignity, and, opposing the Reformation, at length forbade that his subjects should embrace the Protestant faith, or read any of the reformatory writings. His wife Elizabeth, the accomplished Princess of Denmark, however, warmly espoused the Protestant cause, for which she incurred the estrangement, and, finally, almost brutal treatment of her husband. This Joachim was the first and only ruler of the line who opposed the Protestant cause. Dying in 1535, he was succeeded by his son Joachim II., who, open, cheerful and generous to pro-

fusion, joyfully embraced the Protestant faith, and labored to promote the Reformation among his people. By an arrangement with the King of Poland, he procured the subsequent annexation of the old Duchy of Prussia to Brandenburg, and prepared the way by which the Silesian provinces were annexed at a later period.

John George, who succeeded his father in 1597, was cold and rigid in his mode of life, and, displeased with the extravagance of the previous administration, arrested a Jewish banker, because he had grown rich on the prodigality of his father's court, procured against him, without proper evidence of guilt, the sentence of death, which was executed in a cruel manner. This proceeding roused hatred against all the Jews in the district, and they were banished from the country. In due order, John Sigismund succeeded in 1608. Having been won over to the "Reformed" (Calvinistic) wing of the Protestant cause, he was unpopular with the people, who managed to diminish his allowance of money, till he promised to make no further change in spiritual matters. His administration came into the period of the so-called thirty years' war; and though the Rhine countries were added to Brandenburg during his rule, he was not considered adequate to the necessities of the times. In 1619 he was succeeded by his son George William, who was a weak, vacillating Elector, more fond of the pleasures of the table than of the earnest work of government, and did very little worthy of notice.

Frederick William, called also the Great Elector, was a very different man from his father; one of the brightest and most efficient of the whole line, he assumed the government in 1640, and really founded the Prussian State. Up to this time the different sections of country which had been attached to Brandenburg, hung loosely about it, with no such assimilation to it as led to an equalized system of taxation. Frederick William thoroughly organized the government; and from his time, Brandenburg as a leading idea drops out and the history of Prussia proper begins. A man of living faith in God, eminent in prayer, and making the New Testament his

constant companion at home and abroad, he attributed all his success to the help of God, to whom he constantly rendered cordial thanks. Being about to die, he explained to his heir apparent the principles by which his rule had been guided, exhorted him to keep the fear of God before his eyes, and have the army in good trim; since on it, next to Divine aid, depended the security of the States. He left a territory and a population one-third larger than he found them, the revenue increased many fold, and the army six times larger than when he commenced rule.

Frederick III. was a different type of manhood. The father had placed his honor in being truly great; the son endeavored to make up in show what he lacked in substance, and thought it a greater dignity to wear a crown than to possess vigorous brains. He must be king; and after obtaining the consent of the emperor, with great pomp of ceremony set the crown on his own head at Königsberg, the capital of Old Prussia, January 12, 1701, with the title Frederick I.

His son Frederick William succeeded him on the throne in 1713, and was as different from his father as two men could well be. Scarcely waiting for the tears, which he had shed at the bedside of his dying parent, to dry, he called for a list of the household retinue, and struck from it all useless masters of ceremony, retaining only the smallest number of court officers, on the smallest salary. Estimating the value of a sovereign by the strength of his army, he directed his main attention to the money and the soldiers, and gave out that he intended himself to be the minister of finance and the field marshal of the King of Prussia. Rigid in economy, implacable in anger, and almost savage in the exhibition of it, he was the constant terror of his household. At the cradle he commenced to train his eldest son, afterwards Frederick the Great, for a soldier; at thirteen years of age appointed him captain, and when the delicate and quiet loving boy would develop neither talent nor taste in that direction, he turned to hating him with all the strength of his rough nature, and wished even to disinherit him. He seemed, however, in another

phase, a sincere Christian, scrupulous to secure the religious instruction of his people, and careful to have divine service maintained in the army. With all his rigor of economy he had a weakness for a regiment of giants, which he collected from all parts of the world at great expense, and supported in comparative idleness. He lived to become reconciled to his son Fritz, who had matured more to his wishes, and died repeating, "Lord Jesus, thou art my prize in life and in death."

Frederick II. (the Great) took the reins of the Prussian kingdom in 1740; and as a statesman and commander, developed one of the most efficient characters recorded in history. Married against his will, he never lived with his queen. Having been intimate with Voltaire, for this and other reasons, he was a skeptic in his religious views. He was a poet, an amateur of music, and in the latter part of his life more in society with his dogs than mankind. He built Sans Souci at Potsdam, as a cozy palace for his personal comfort, and after the "seven years' war" the "New Palace," a mile distant, to show his enemies that his treasury was not exhausted. Though he lived an irregular life and had glaring faults, he yet possessed noble traits of character. Dying childless in 1786, he was succeeded by his nephew as Frederick William II. At this time rationalism was undermining the doctrines of the Lutheran Church; and while the king endeavored to enforce uniformity, the people murmured against tyranny in faith. There was, therefore, in this reign, a rebellion of religious belief and a civil war of creeds. The territory was greatly increased in this period, and yet the reign was not considered *good times* in Prussia. Frederick William III. was born while his great uncle was still living. The old king took him in his arms, and with tears of joy, expressed high hopes of his future. He ascended the throne in 1797, and is represented as possessing in the highest degree, manly and royal qualities. Added to his native loveliness and dignity, he was a devoted Christian; and ruled by example as well as authority. In all amiable qualities, his queen Louisa was his equal. The early part of

his reign was harassed by the career of Napoleon I., the latter part, peaceful, and devoted to valuable improvements. The University of Berlin was founded during this period.

Frederick William IV., inheriting the best of parental examples, of fair talents and a finished education, ascended the throne with high hopes on the part of the people; and succeeded well, till inveterate disease compelled him to resign the government to the regency of his younger brother in 1858. On the death of the king, three years later, the Prince Regent succeeded in 1861 as William (I). He was seventy-four years of age last March, with a strong body and well balanced mind.

France declared war against Prussia July 15, 1870. The next day the Prussian army entered France, and William went to the front on the 27th. September 2d, Napoleon surrendered to him. On the second of March the German army entered Paris and peace closed the struggle. When William returned to Berlin, he was crowned Emperor of Germany.

In review, it is seen, that the Hohenzollerns, at first, by personal enterprise earned their way into Brandenburg, then a rude district. They enlarged and finally erected the Electorate into a powerful kingdom, around which United Germany has consolidated a second empire. The process has been as simple as the progress has been constant. With one or two exceptions, the succession has been made up of men of good sense, of Christian character, and who have attended to their own business. Ever blocking the wheels of progress so as to prevent a backward movement, they have never lost by indolence the fruit of a success they had gained by industry. Any seeming stand-still has only been preparation for farther advance.

ELECTORAL LINE OF HOHENZOLLERN.

1415-1440, Frederick I.

1440-1470, Frederick II. (Irontooth).

1470-1486, Albert Achilles.

1486-1499, John Cicero.

- 1499-1535, Joachim I. (Nestor).
- 1535-1571, Joachim II. (Hector) and John of Kustria.
- 1571-1597, John George.
- 1597-1608, Joachim Frederick.
- 1608-1619, John Sigismund.
- 1619-1640, George William.
- 1640-1688, Frederick William, the great Elector.
- 1688-1701, Frederick III.

KINGS OF PRUSSIA.

- 1701-1713, Frederick I. (the former Elector Fred. III.)
- 1713-1740, Frederick William I.
- 1740-1786, Frederick II., the Great.
- 1786-1797, Frederick William II.
- 1797-1840, Frederick William III.
- 1840-1861, Frederick William IV.
- (1858-1861), Regency of the Prince of Prussia.
- Since 1861. William (I.) crowned as Emperor of Germany in 1871.
- Frederick William, Crown Prince, born October 18, 1831, married Victoria, Princess Royal of England, in 1858.
- Frederick William Victor, their oldest son, born January 27, 1859.

THE BOOK TABLE.

JESUS: HIS LIFE AND WORK as Narrated by the Four Evangelists. By Howard Crosby. New York: University Publishing Company. 1871. Pp. 550, 800.

Dr. Crosby has here set himself honestly and laboriously to do what he announces, viz: "To let the life of Jesus speak for itself; to take the narratives of the evangelists and make one out of four, only adding such matter as a knowledge of the Greek language and Palestine topography might suggest. In this way I have endeavored to fill out the pictures of the sacred writers, without the aid of mere fancy, and never to go beyond the limits that the text warrants." He rightly believes—as against much modern flippant remark—in the practicability of constructing a *harmony*, with a clear coincidence in the great outlines, and without contradiction in portraying *different sides of one fact*. This last point he aptly illustrates thus: "Ten thousand years hence a history may be preserved which will speak of a Corsican named Bonaparte astonishing Europe by the victory of Marengo, and sitting, with his wife Josephine, on the throne of France. Another history will tell of a Frenchman named Napoleon, whose wife was the Austrian archduchess, Marie Louise, who made his fame by the battle of Austerlitz, and ruled with despotic sway over Italy, Germany, Holland, and France. The criticism which finds discrepancies in the four gospels could never reconcile these two histories of the same Emperor."

Besides its thoroughly reverent spirit this narrative has many excellent features. It is contained within a reasonable compass. Its mechanical execution is inviting. Its one hundred and three maps and engravings are real illustrations, aptly selected, and many of them novel. The life is a narrative, and not a series of disquisitions. We read, in general, the results and not the processes of investigation. It is written in the most direct of styles, everything *translated* into the language of ordinary life, and invested, so far as possible, with all the accessory facts and circumstances. There is no attempt at "fine writing," although in many parts, as in describing the arrest of our Saviour (p. 464) and His ascension (p. 527), the narrative becomes eminently graphic by its simple directness. If we were looking for a Life of Christ to place in the hands of a young person, in order to give him a compact and clear apprehension of that wonderful history, we know of none that would answer the purpose better.

Of course judgments will differ in regard to a multitude of details. It strikes us at times that the language chosen to represent the meaning of

the narrative is almost too homely, and that in some of the deviations from the common version there is no gain in clearness while there is a loss in dignity and sometimes in point or even precision. "Leading a brilliant life in daily luxury" (p. 351) is more cumbrous and not much more exact than "fared sumptuously every day;" "distressed in this flame" less correct than "tormented;" "manure-heap" no gain upon "dung-hill" (p. 343) in any respect; "when thou givest a luncheon party" (p. 340) fails after all to convey quite the right impression; "bags, bundles, and utensils" is rather a large liberty with the one word *σκεῦος*, etc.

We might also doubt some of the translations: "That the *strifes* may be revealed from many hearts" (p. 35) is unsupported by usage. "Am well pleased" should be changed not into "have been" but "*was* well pleased" (p. 73). "Even if he be dead" (p. 330) should probably read "die." "The kingdom of God always is among you" (p. 354), misses the point by the unwarrantable insertion of "*always*." "Ye who speak are nothing, but the Holy Spirit" (p. 417), seems to us wrong and our version right. By making Christ's blessing of little children chiefly a lesson of "faith and humility" (p. 360) the author fails to give the direct and clear meaning of the transaction and the utterance. We can not see how "Nazarene," in Matt. ii, 23, has any connection with Nazarite; we find no reason to regard the desert of Sinai as the place of temptation (p. 74); we should not derive "Iscaiot" from Issachar (p. 147); "our Hebrew *versions*" (p. 97) is an oversight; it is doubtful whether we should positively assign the "Magi" to Chaldea (p. 35); we find it difficult in view of other usage, to understand Mark's "third hour" (xv, 25) as the third hour "since the Sanhedrim had carried Jesus to Pilate" (p. 493), or to see how the simple *distance* of Nathaniel's "retirement" should have made our Saviour's allusion so striking and so convincing to him (p. 87). We had noted other similar points, which perhaps it is not necessary to enumerate. We should not incline so wholly to overlook the diverse reading (*σὺδοξίας*) of the angels' song (p. 31), nor to decide so positively in favor of the genuineness of John v, 4. Such minor matters, however, do not prevent this Life from being a judicious and scholarly work.

LANGE'S CRITICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND HOMILETICAL COMMENTARY. The Gospel of St. John. Translated and Edited by P. Schaff, D.D. New York: C. Scribner & Co. Chicago: W. G. Holmes. Pp. 654. 8vo.

This portion of Lange's Commentary has been looked for with more interest than most of the volumes, because of the striking character of the gospel, the lack of good detached commentaries upon it, and the preliminary announcement that this would "be universally regarded as 'the Commentary of Commentaries upon the Gospel of Gospels.'" The American editor has added a very large amount of labor to what may be regarded as one of the best of Lange's expositions. The additions amount to one-third, appearing in almost every paragraph. Among the excellencies and conveniences of the work may be reckoned: the brief notices of text-readings, brought down to the present time; the sober and spiritual character of the exposi-

tion; the common enumeration of diverse views, considerably supplemented by Dr. Schaff; the large amount of suggestive material accumulated round the text; the use of the latest sources, English and German. The editor's range of selected matter is very wide, as is the breadth of his scholarship. The work is a valuable accession to the apparatus for the study of this wonderful gospel, and the more so in proportion to the wisdom and skill of the student. Ordinary readers and students will be somewhat disappointed in their expectations of the "Commentary of Commentaries," and scholars will still wait for the appearance of such a phenomenon. The points of shortcoming — some of them, however, inseparable from the original plan — are: (1) The lack of unity, of which the editor himself speaks in his preface. (2) The very common want of clear, compact statement, such as marks the best English commentators, which would not only save room, but make the exposition more intelligible. In this respect the editor is not faultless. Thus, in his long note on "born of water and of Spirit," (iii., 14) he seems to start rightly, puts forth a promise of the right exposition, and grows dimmer to the end, leaving one a little in doubt at last what he does mean. So while the elements of a right interpretation of i., 14 ("born not of blood," etc.) are set before us, it is doubtful, notwithstanding the labors of both Lange and Schaff, whether the reader will find the interpretation. We could instance numerous cases of the kind. (3) A superfluous accumulation of material. Many of the extracts and notes are not called for, and rather confuse than help. The interpretations are often loaded with side-issues and topics; and thus, the more important the passage and the greater the labor to make it clear, the more cumbrous, often, the exposition. (4) The relative subordination of the exegetical element. The author, though generally judicious, is not especially strong in this respect, and the editor is more a theologian and historian than an interpreter. For those who desire it we will not object to the amount of "theological and homiletical" matter that swells the volume; but we desire in a commentary a more thorough exegesis. Notwithstanding the mass of material and the frequent brightness of suggestion, the discussion often fails to be complete or exhaustive.

For example, while the three propositions of i, 1, might be much more sharply brought out, both author and editor fail to give the real additional proposition of verse second. They fail to give the full thought of the "hath everlasting life" (iii, 35), which Lange simply speaks of as "this inwardness of eternal life." Both fail to sustain their rendering of *ἀνωθεν* (iii, 3) "from above" by the very important consideration of John's own unmistakable use in the same chapter (v. 31) as well as xix, 11, 23, and to answer the argument from Nicodemus's phrase "a second time," etc. Generally, however, the results reached are judicious. Dr. Schaff corrects Lange's unwarranted translation "suppressed" in i, 5, for *apprehended*; but falls into his error (xi, 25) of attributing necessarily a "past" signification to an aorist in the subjunctive mood ("have died" for "die") — whereas, the aorist in the other moods than the indicative carries simply the notion

of transient action, irrespective of date. We observe that the editor accepts the omission of v, 4, with Tischendorf and others; while he unhesitatingly rejects the attempt to find only an "unfermented juice of the grape" in the wine of Cana. We can hardly assent to occasional views, such as that the "irresistible effect" is one of the points of comparison between the wind and the Spirit in John iii, and (in explaining the phrase "only begotten son") "the term is called figurative, but it is more correct to say that all earthly relationships of fathers and filial affection are a figure and reflection of the eternal fatherhood of God and the eternal Sonship of Christ." On a question of construction (as the emphasis of $\frac{7}{8}$, i, 9) he can hardly correct Meyer, nor does he stand quite on the plane of Alford's critical scholarship.

On the whole, this commentary, if it be not the end of all commentaries on John, will be received as containing a large amount of valuable suggestion.

CHRISTIANITY AND POSITIVISM. Lectures on the "Ely Foundations," Union Theological Seminary, New York. By James McCosh, D.D., LL.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. Chicago: W. G. Holmes. Pp. 369.

One of these lectures, upon Renan, and the Life of Jesus not a Romance, has been published also in the Philadelphia Course of Lectures, 1870-71. Among the noticeable things in the volume is the use of "law" entirely in the sense of "order." "Cause" is also used in the multiple sense which Mill has attempted to substitute for the established English sense — including all the antecedents to an effect, taken or massed together, on the meaning of the word — as if it were (what it is not) a noun of multitude. It is thus Dr. McC. supposes he can best refute Huxley on protoplasm, when he admits that the elements of protein must be present under *certain conditions* in order to produce "the physical basis of life." But it is as good an answer, if not better, to say, that, all the various sorts and degrees of property or power belonging to these elements being present, another power, which is, *par eminence*, cause, changes protein into protoplasm; and it needs but one. Nor is Dr. McC. consistent with himself or sound philosophy when he says we are "entitled to argue that every effect must have a cause." We are entitled to *argue* for no positions which can be disproved. But this is a proposition we do not argue for: but are entitled to affirm. So he uses "Ends" as a synonyme for Final Cause, which is loose thinking. He evidently mistakes the philosophical meaning of "substance;" no good thinker conceives of it as a substratum supporting things, but only as supporting attributes, and together therewith, constituting things. All he says about *things* not needing any addition to them for outside support, has no point. He closes up his refutation of Nescience with the proposition: "We have a full knowledge of a thing only when we know its causes. [Aggregate conditions *a la* Mill.] We have a very imperfect knowledge of the works of nature till we view them as works of God:" which is all very

true, but God is not "causes," but cause *singular*,—that one pre-eminent, adequate producing power, which ranks above all conditions. So he misquots Aristotle,— "we know things in their *causes*." But τὴν πρότην αἰτίαν is singular number; Aristotle had never thought of Mill's doctrine, or of cause or reason as a noun of multitude. It is also to be noticed, as in other works of this excellent author, that he often falls into a mixture of metaphors, and loose, hasty constructions that mar style and sense, and his nominatives are in some instances sadly awry, as on p. 164, "it" and "they"—interchangeably referring to "the party of Free Thought." So practised a writer as Dr. McC. might avoid such errors.

This volume contains three series of lectures—I. Christianity and Physical Science; II. Christianity and Mental Science; III. Christianity and Historical Investigation. No other volume of the sort criticises Mill, Huxley, Bain, Darwin, Tyndall, Büchner, Spencer, Comte, Parker, Buckle, Barker, Wallace, Maudesley, Hume, Emerson, Renan, and "Ecce Homo." The answers to unbelievers are often shrewd, terse, acute, and happy. More than one epigrammatic turn enlivens Dr. McCosh's pages. And great candor and intelligence mark his discussions throughout.

The title, "Christianity and Positivism," does not correctly indicate the character of the book, which ranges widely over the evidences of Christianity. Perhaps its mistake consists in attempting to cover more ground than one man can well manage, without more preparation. With many good points, it exhaustively discusses nothing. It is rather popular than profound—marked rather by *width* than depth; and therefore perhaps better fitted for general reading than specially adapted to the wants of professional students. Accompanied by Dr. McCosh's personal presence and earnest manner, and addressed to a sympathetic audience, we can easily conceive that these lectures should be quite effective; but they hardly constitute a great book. Some of the subjects of his painting would probably deny the correctness of the portraiture.

Can a Scotchman (or an Irishman or Dutchman,) ever learn the distinction between *shall* and *will*? "I would be constrained to seek for a cause," etc., p. 18. "I am sure I will be able to discover," p. 23. "I am confident I will be able to point out a curious adaptation," p. 24.

LANGE'S CRITICAL, DOCTRINAL AND HOMILETICAL COMMENTARY. JEREMIAH AND LAMENTATIONS. By Dr. C. W. E. Nægelsbach. Edited by Rev. S. R. Asbury and W. H. Hornblower, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. Chicago: W. G. Holmes. Pp. 642, 800.

As the herald of disaster and the organ of rebuke and lamentation, Jeremiah has attracted less attention, both from the reader and the expositors, than some other writers of the Old Testament. There is also a lack of decisive historical incidents, an absence of clear arrangement in the deliverances, a reiteration in the strain, and perhaps a want of the more remarkable poetic qualities of style, which have made his writings relatively less prominent. For this reason the critical apparatus on this prophet has been

less complete and abundant. This volume therefore supplies a want. So far as we have had time to examine, the commentary seems written in a candid spirit—critical but not presumptuous, with a fair amount of learning and ability, but characterized by no very marked features. The translators have addressed themselves chiefly to their legitimate work. The first of them has confined himself in his additions mainly to selected matter. The second has expanded more considerably. Dr. Hornblower rightly and most successfully combats Nægelsbach's theory that Jeremiah was not the author of Lamentations. The objections are not strong; but that does not matter. It seems to be a great national duty of a commentator born in Germany to deny the authority of some portion of the Old Testament. Dr. Hornblower adds a considerable number of notes and discussions, in many of which he controverts the positions of his author. The American edition contains 147 pages more than the German. We may hereafter speak of this volume more in detail, when we have had time to examine it more minutely.

SERMONS TO THE NATURAL MAN. By W. G. T. Shedd, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. Chicago: W. G. Holmes. 12mo. Pp 422.

Twenty earnest, thoughtful, direct, penetrating, and therefore powerful, sermons. That conscience must be seared that would not throb under this preaching. Would there were more of it, in suitable proportions. It reminds us of Er-kine Mason and of Asabel Nettleton. We do not understand that these constitute the whole staple of the author's ministrations, but that they are selected for a special purpose. They are specimens of a searching method with "the natural man," which no true and thoroughly faithful preacher can dispense with, however trying the process. The titles tell the story: The future state a self-conscious state; God's exhaustive knowledge of man; all mankind guilty; sin in the heart the source of error in the head; the necessity of Divine influences; self-scrutiny in God's presence, etc.

We fully accord with the author, that "it is vain to offer the gospel unless the law has been applied with clearness and cogency." The very opening of the Sermon on the Mount is an offer of the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. No man comes to Christ the Saviour who does not feel that himself is a lost sinner. The depth of his trust in Christ will never exceed the sense of his need. A vast amount of shallow religion comes from shallow convictions, beginning with shallow convictions of sin.

We also agree with him, that "theoretical unbelief respecting the doctrines of the New Testament" is "not the principal difficulty," but "the practical unbelief of speculative believers." Whole battalions of heresies are mowed down before the mighty onset of God's Holy Spirit. The shortest method with most skeptics is to convince them of sin and press home clear known duty. We are not of the number of those who are disturbed by the "sombre cast" of these discourses. Religion is something more than a pleasant entertainment. The condition of a sinner away from God is something different from a series of pulpit jokes on Sunday. Shallow deal-

ing with the deepest, the most solemn and critical of all human concerns, is, if not the characteristic, yet the temptation, of the modern pulpit. There are those who stately utter but half God's message, and *who justify themselves in so doing.*

Without minutely interrogating every sentiment of these discourses, we cordially concur in their great aim, fervent spirit, and pungent method. May they serve to recall "natural" men to things spiritual, and "natural" preachers to the truth of God. Reckless, ambitious, frivolous and facetious Sabbath *oratory* may gain the applause of men and win a seeming and outward success; the loving, courageous, faithful declaration of Christ's truth will gain the approval of God, and the success which is ETERNAL.

SERMONS OF HENRY WARD BEECHER. Plymouth Pulpit. Fourth Series. March—September, 1870. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. Pp. 456.

The author of "Ecce Homo" says, "a single mind may hold a vast variety of images, but not many ideas. Such men may write a great deal, as Mr. Carlyle has done, yet in reality they say little. It is one air with infinite variations; one principle with a multitude of applications. And the principle is not generally hard to find, for the writer's sole object is to make it as vividly clear to others as it is to himself. and this is the express purpose of the endless variety of forms in which he presents it." Mr. Beecher is one of the most brilliant of American illustrations of these remarks. The two principles, that everything God does is to be explained by His love, i. e. kindness, and that all religious truth is to be appreciated and acquired by love-feeling, rather than by reason or understanding, are dressed in innumerable changes of raiment. This volume is like its predecessors in these respects. The topics are all immediately practical—even the single one whose title promises some exploration of fundamental truth, Sermon XVII, "Moral Constitution of Man," opens only a series of inferences and corollaries from the existence of our moral nature. There are passages of needful and earnest rebuke, *e. g.*, of money loving, of late hours, of corruption in city officers, of George Sands' works; and the preacher's mind seems full as ever of pictures of human life, habit, and character. We are glad to find him saying—Sermon VII—"There is a time for dogma and doctrine," though he finds precious little time for it, if any.

THE RELIGION OF THE PRESENT AND OF THE FUTURE: Sermons preached chiefly at Yale College. By Theodore D. Woolsey. New York: C. Scribner & Co. Chicago: W. G. Holmes. 12 mo. Pp. 402.

Here are twenty-five thoughtful, practical, evangelical sermons, which, we hope, may find a wide circulation. The range of subjects is quite varied, and embraces many common themes of the Christian pulpit. But a nice analysis and freshness of illustration give interest and force to the treatment of all. They are not strictly doctrinal, nor argumentative, nor sentimental, least of all, sensational sermons; yet they address the common sense of men, and fall in with the current thinking of our times in such a way as effect-

ively to counteract the prevailing tendency to slight the fundamental truths of Christianity.

All classes will find interest and profit in the careful study of these discourses. They seem especially adapted to settle the views of young persons of intelligence and culture, such as composed the audience to which they were addressed. To ministers and theological students, they present excellent models of pure style and happy arrangement of thought. As here presented, the Religion of the Present and of the Future appears identical with that which has been proved in the Past to be "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." To the sons of Yale the volume is particularly commended, by the author's graceful dedication.

A SMALLER SCRIPTURE HISTORY. In three parts. Old Testament History; Connection of Old and New Testaments; New Testament History to A. D. 70. Edited by William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D. New York: Harper & Brothers. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 16mo. Pp. 375.

This is a judicious abridgment of Dr. Smith's fuller work bearing the same title, and is well adapted for use as a text-book for schools. As a book of reference for ministers, Sunday-school teachers, and intelligent Christians generally, the larger work is none too full.

THE PARABLES OF OUR LORD. By Rev. William Arnot. London: T. Nelson & Sons. Edinburgh and New York. 12mo. Pp. 532.

Hitherto Trench on the Parables has been almost the only book, accessible to the English reader, exclusively devoted to that topic. The present volume will meet a warm welcome. On the whole, for general use, it is a very decided advance upon its predecessor. It makes less show of quotations and learning, and while written with the glow and practicalness of a series of sermons, is yet critical in spirit and method. The writer has evidently used all available helps, as well as thought for himself, and has given an admirable exposition. Some features of the parables seem to us more judiciously handled than we have seen them elsewhere. While the points are well selected, and the differences of those which seem alike clearly presented, care is taken to avoid magnifying details and emphasizing subordinate matters. It is a valuable aid to the study of the parables.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE. By Professor Dr. Ernst Curtius. Translated by Adolphus William Ward, of Cambridge, Eng. Vol. I. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 12mo, pp. 509.

The thanks of American scholars are due to the enterprising publishing house which has undertaken to bring this valuable work, in attractive form, within their reach. The author's name has not heretofore attained a wide notoriety, though all who have listened to his lectures or read his occasional articles, know him as a close student and a fresh, clear, and eminent expounder of historical subjects pertaining to his chosen field of research. The work of which the first volume is before us embodies the results of a

life of study; and these results are such as must place Curtius in rank with Niebuhr and Bunsen, Arnold and Grote, among the profound and original investigators.

This first volume tells of Greece before the Persian wars. It is chiefly occupied in tracing the origin of the Hellenic race, the beginning and unfolding of its early civilization, the founding of states, and the migrations and changes among them. The old legends and mythology have been carefully and boldly sifted to discover the elements of fact from which they sprung. The most striking peculiarity of the work is the manner in which the physical geography of Eastern Europe and Western Asia and the islands of the inner sea, is made to tell the story of the men that lived and the things that were done there, three thousand years and more ago. The author moves over sea and land, as one thoroughly familiar with every hill, valley, and plain, with every channel, island, and port, and with all the remains and monuments of ages past, scattered along his range. Each spot to him has a meaning, and shows its record or gives its hint of the far distant past. He seems to see just where and how the myth had its birth and the bard picked up the matter of his epos. From these data are deduced views striking and interesting as well for their originality as for their apparently clear explanation of many things hitherto unintelligible. The book demands and at the same time inspires close and earnest thought on the part of the reader. Some of the conclusions may be questioned, but only a master in Grecian lore will venture to grapple with the argument.

The translator has done his work, in the main, well, though occasionally we have to work through an involved German sentence of English words. It is to be hoped that with the concluding volume a copious index will be furnished, for convenience in referring to the many topics so ably discussed; for the history is unquestionably to be one of the standard works.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM. Written by himself. In three volumes. Vol. I, 12mo, pp. 380. New York: Harper & Brothers. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co.

The high eminence gained by Lord Brougham as a scholar and a statesman, the great events which marked the long period of his connection with the public affairs of England and Europe, and his distinguished services in the spheres both of literature, science and politics, combine to bring us with high expectation to this, his own story of his life. But we are disappointed to find so little of real value in this first volume. The narrative is characterised by the garrulity of old age — the infirmity of a great mind past its highest vigor and soundness of judgment. But little discrimination seems to have been used in the selection of letters for publication. Some, indeed, present vivid pictures of the men and things of a former age, and throw light on the hidden causes of events; but many are insignificant and almost tedious. This volume closes with the year 1811, when Brougham was first returned to Parliament. The two volumes yet to appear will no doubt possess higher interest and value, as they will bring to view his own immediate contact with affairs of State and the steps of his advancement to highest honors.

THE DESCENT OF MAN, and Selection in Relation to Sex. By Charles Darwin, F.R.S. With Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. Two vols., 12mo. Pp. 409 and 436.

This new publication is already re-awakening the stir of Darwinism. Mr. Darwin's theory serves the useful purposes of becoming a receptacle of facts, and a stimulus to further observation. We are entirely willing to abide the results of careful and complete investigation, whenever they shall be reached. It is almost needless to say that this, like Mr. Darwin's previous great work, gathers up a vast mass of alleged facts, and has merits and interest aside from the theory it advocates. It would be idle for us in these limits to enter on a question so expansive, and now so engrossing, as the main topic of the book. We content ourselves with a few suggestions that have occurred to us in reading. One is, that while matters relating to sex enter so largely into the discussion as to make it not quite desirable reading for promiscuous assemblies, they also make it evident that the whole underlying question of sex, in *its uniformity of fact* and variety of detail, is one of the most insuperable difficulties in the way of the theory. We are also impressed with the necessity of sifting the facts, which, as we read the authorities cited, seem to us rather a collection than a selection. As we read page after page of theories piled upon each other, to show how the infinite diversities now witnessed could have come about (*e. g.*, the diverse pitch and quality of the male and female voices from the greater use by the male ancestors in animal love-song), we can not help thinking of a compound fraction — say one millionth multiplied into itself perpetually. When we read the assumption, which runs through the book, that similarity of embryonic structure is proof of historic connection and descent, we are amazed at the facility of *scientific* reasoning. The attempt to bridge over the grand chasm between man and the animals, the moral nature of the human being, seems to us almost ludicrous in its debility; while the speculations upon the gradual emergence of a code of morality from the brutal condition through the development of "the social instincts," and the implication that all we now call vice and crime has been merely a natural stage in that development, we can not help feeling to be not very congenial to elevated sentiment. We are not in haste to accept it till proved.

We mention, simply as a fact, that in this work Mr. Darwin boldly, repeatedly, and at length, declares that "man is certainly descended from some ape-like creature" (ii., 345), from "the Old-World monkeys" (i., 205); and he goes still further back (i., 198) to find his "early progenitors" "covered with hair," with "pointed ears, capable of movement," "provided with a tail," and a "prehensile foot," "arboreal in their habits," "at a much earlier period," with a double uterus, a cloaca, and the eye protected by a nictating membrane; at a still earlier period "aquatic in habits;" then "as lowly organized as the lancelet or amphioxus," and at length an "hermaphrodite."

We add that Mivart's "Genesis of Species," noticed in this number of the REVIEW, contains some telling scientific facts that lie in the way

of this whole scheme. Moreover, thus far the whole subject lies in just this shape: that, with all this accumulation of facts and speculations, while attempting to prove that *all the countless species* have come from a common germ, he has not yet proved that *one* of these species has been derived from a different source than its own specific germ. So far as appears, Mr. Huxley's admission still remains true (Lay Sermons, p. 276): "that there are such things in nature as groups of animals and of plants, whose members are incapable of fertile union with those of other groups; and there are such things as hybrids, which are absolutely sterile when crossed with other hybrids." This being so, we can not fail to be reminded of the argument which Whately mentions, in which a large amount of facts and reasonings were arranged elaborately and at great length, so as to hide the circumstance that the one hinge-fact of the whole discussion was not true.

ON THE GENESIS OF SPECIES. By St. George Mivart, F.R.S. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 12mo., pp. 314.

This is an able and searching investigation of the Darwinian Theory of Natural Selection, by one thoroughly versed in the sciences, by whose facts that theory must be maintained or refuted. The presentation of the whole subject is marked by great candor and fairness, as was natural with one whose examination was undertaken for the satisfaction of his own mind. The author says of himself, that "he was not originally disposed to reject Mr. Darwin's fascinating theory. Reiterated endeavors to solve its difficulties have, however, had the effect of convincing him that that theory, as the one, or as the leading, explanation of the successive evolution and manifestation of specific forms, is untenable. At the same time, he admits fully that Natural Selection acts and must act, and that it plays in the organic world a certain, though a secondary and subordinate, part."

After a full statement of his objections to Darwinism, Mr. Mivart brings out, as most satisfactory to his own mind, a theory of the genesis of species, by "a successive and orderly evolution of organic forms," in which "innate, internal powers" are "stimulated, evoked, and determined by external conditions," according to established laws of nature, "conferred by God in the first instance," and carried out in their minute applications all along, "with the Divine concurrence." The book is thus well adapted, on the one hand, to counteract the mischievous tendency of Darwin's theory to rule God out of Creation; and on the other, to reassure the minds of believers; as it shows how the advance of real science tends to confirm our faith in the God of Creation, Providence, and Revelation, however new discoveries may, from time to time, correct our views of His methods and agencies for accomplishing His wise designs. Chapter IX., on Evolution and Ethics, and Chapter XII., on Theology and Evolution, are of special significance for both these ends. We welcome the book as a valuable help to settle minds that have been disturbed, perhaps distressed, by the large infusion of atheistic materialism in the modern presentations of science. The mischief is not in science itself, but in the false cast given to it by men of great learning, who seem at heart hostile to religion.

QUESTIONS OF MODERN THOUGHT: Lectures by Drs. McCosh, Thompson, W. Adams, Schaff, Hague, and E. O. Haven. Philadelphia: Zeigler & McCurdy.

These lectures seem to have been delivered in a course at Philadelphia (1870-71), similar to the "Boston Course" of the last two years, and subsequently published in separate pamphlets, before collection into a volume. They are not altogether equal in merit. And they are various in style. As a whole the volume is not up to the mark of the Boston volume of last year in range or freshness of treatment, nor in the order of topics; but is fitted, still, to be largely useful. It is of a sort that ought to multiply, but ought also to be very well done.

SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE: or the Mosaic Creation and Modern Discoveries. By Prof. H. W. Morris. Philadelphia: Ziegler & McCurdy. Pp. 566.

The publishers seem to have a laudable ambition to put scientific-religious books upon the tables of the people along with the illustrated scientific books of the day. The *Six Days of Creation* are here elaborately expounded in the light of science. Handsome open type, tinted paper, mezzotints, make up a goodly volume, like those of Dr. March, issued by the same house, which ought to entertain and instruct thousands of households, and drive a world of trash from their tables. All the expositions perhaps no one can agree to. Touching the days, the author is a literalist — goes for six natural days — but *representative* of longer periods. He holds to a watery chaos preceding the period of human life.

THE PASTOR'S MANUAL: Containing Scriptural Readings, Watchwords, Forms of Marriage, etc. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. Chicago: Rev. G. S. F. Savage. Pp. 84; fifty cents.

Every pastor knows the value of some such simple hand-book. This little manual has been prepared with care and good judgment. It has appropriate selections of Scripture for the various occasions of organization of churches, dedications of houses of worship, ordinations, visitations of the sick, funerals, missionary concerts, etc.; also, forms of marriage, rules of order in church meetings, order of exercises in public services; certificates of dismission from churches, of approbation to ministers, etc. In a word, it is just such a manual as every pastor would find a convenience.

SMITH'S SALOON: or, The Grays and the Grants. By Mrs. L. L. Worth. Boston: I. P. Warren, 52 Washington street. Chicago: H. A. Sumner, 110 Dearborn street. Pp. 300. \$1.25.

This is a well-written Temperance story. It depicts, in glowing and truthful language, the terrible brood of evils which sprang up from the planting of a "saloon" in the midst of a sober and Christian community — corrupting the morals, destroying the health, and impoverishing those drawn within its influence. Such books need to be multiplied, to impress more deeply the public mind with the fearful curse of intemperance.

CALVINISM: An Address delivered at St. Andrew's, March 17, 1871. By J. A. Froude. New York: C. Scribner & Co. Chicago: H. A. Sumner. Pp. 47.

A notable setting forth of the grandeur of Calvinism, in its spirit and its achievements—peculiarly striking as proceeding from the great historian. It deserves a place beside the concessions of Hume and the declarations of Macaulay, Guizot and Bancroft.

THE WONDERS OF THE HEAVENS. By Camille Flammarion. With forty-eight illustrations. New York: C. Scribner & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co.

Another of the "Wonder Series," stating and popularizing the latest results of astronomy. A good and useful book.

NEWLYN HOUSE: the Home of the Davenports. Boston: Israel P. Warren. 52 Washington street. Chicago: H. A. Sumner, 110 Dearborn street. Pp. 361. \$1.50.

GO AHEAD; or Jack the Cabin-Boy. Boston: I. P. Warren. Chicago: H. A. Sumner. Pp. 144. 60 cents.

The first of these volumes is a story of English life, and illustrates happily the blessedness of self denial, in the every-day experiences of a Christian home. The other, shows how that by fidelity and energy a poor cabin-boy made his way up to a position of influence and honor. It is an attractive book for boys, and will be salutary in its influence upon them.

THE TWO BOYS, and what they did with a Year. Pp. 313. \$1.25.

FAITH DUNCAN, or Dare to do Right. Pp. 171. 90 cents.

THE RESCUED GIRL. Pp. 177. 90 cents.

MARGARET AND BESSIE. Pp. 168. 90 cents. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 13 Cornhill. Chicago: Rev. G. S. F. Savage, 84 Washington street.

The Congregational Publishing Society is doing a very valuable service in providing a truly Christian literature for our Sunday-schools. They have upon their catalogue a large list of attractive and useful books; and their recent issues indicate a purpose to keep abreast of all others in the excellence of their publications. We have not space to notice separately these latest books; but having read them, heartily commend them as worthy a place in all our Sunday-school libraries.

THE ROUND TABLE.

COMMUNION INVITATIONS.—The discussion of this subject is timely still. Loose invitations to "all who love our Lord Jesus," or, in the words of one, to "whoever feels the love of Christ beating in him," however specious they sound, in our opinion alike transcend *the right of the minister* to extend, and violate the fundamental principles and position of a Christian church. They are among the devices whereby men, unconsciously, yet none the less effectually, obliterate the line between the Church and the world — between those who deliberately set themselves to follow Christ and those who deliberately do not.

The only plausible defense of it that we have heard from really sound men, is this: "It is not *our* business to judge men's fitness, but theirs; and the responsibility rests back wholly on them." Plausible, but false. If it were true, the whole system of *church* relationships, church fellowships, church ordinances, and *church discipline* is spurious. *The Church is not open to all*, nor even to all who choose, nor to all who deem themselves worthy. It is for saints, believers, disciples of Christ. So then are its ordinances and fellowships. The applicant is never the sole judge of fitness, nor takes the sole responsibility. The Church judges and decides too; *is commanded* to judge, sometimes to withdraw and to reject. In the last result the responsibility is always there. Rules and tests are given the Church by which to judge and to decide. To fail of this is to fail of a primary duty of the Church; it is in principle to annihilate the Church. To proffer even its fellowship indiscriminately, and to disown responsibility in the matter, is to stultify itself and to disobey its Lord. These loose invitations are such a proffer. The persons not church-members thus not merely accepted but solicited, are the persons who are statedly and deliberately refusing to give suitable indications of discipleship. The thing is disorderly and inconsistent.

No emergency can be pleaded for such disorders. One who for weeks, months, and years, has declined the *proper* opportunities of coming to church fellowship, can plead no pressure on a Sabbath day. Even a dying man able to partake of the elements is able to be baptised. If the necessity were urgent enough to summon to the communion the man who yesterday refused alliance with God's people, and may again to-morrow, then it is urgent enough to arrest other proceedings and ascertain on the spot if he is worthy to be invited. His piety, if genuine, can wait for an orderly admission,

without injury. Besides, why make systematic arrangements and present inducements for cases of the rarest occurrence? And further still, what right has a Congregational minister to usurp the functions of the Church, and extend an invitation which commonly the specific rules of that Church forbid?

Meanwhile we do no good, but more likely harm, to the individual, while wronging the Church. We induce him to feel that some magical effect is thus to be wrought for one who will not take upon him permanently the yoke of Christ. We ease off, to his apprehension, the separation between saint and sinner. We even encourage him to go on refusing permanently to ally himself to God's people; for we say, it makes no difference.

And finally the Church places itself in this absurd position, that by the invitation a man who has just been deliberately excommunicated *by the Church* has a right to consider himself, if he choose, called *by the minister* straight back to the communion table. It requires but a moderate consideration of the first principles of church constitution and functions to see that such practices are indefensible on evangelical grounds.

BOOK NOTICES.—An Eastern paper complains that as the leading magazines are all owned by great publishers, candid book notices are not to be found in them. We have no occasion to affirm or deny. But we take the opportunity to say that we believe the faithful account of new books to be one of the most important functions of a periodical. A multitude of readers who have no funds to waste, and no opportunity to examine, wish to know, as nearly as possible, the character of the various new publications, to guide their own purchases. We have made it a matter of conscience to give, without fear or favor, a fair statement in each case. We will accept a book on no other condition. We prefer to buy. If a publisher issues a work that will not abide a true statement of its value, it is not worth his while to send it, nor do we care to see it. We are happy to know that our readers appreciate the truth and fairness, and in many cases the thoroughness, of our criticisms — and that they act upon them.

A WOMAN WITH A SPHERE.—We are glad to insert in this number a woman's portrait of a woman. The brief sketch of Miss Lyon will be recognized by all who knew her, as thoroughly truthful. She was precisely the person therein described. Few characters are a more profitable study. Her example is as imperishable as her work. Lacking, through her imperfect early training, some of the outward graces and elegances, she was filled with the grace of God and with the fullness of all womanly feeling and genuine courtesy. Physically robust, and intellectually clear-headed and resolute, with powers of endurance and executive abilities seldom equaled in her own sex and surpassed by very few of the other sex, no Fifth Avenue girl had a profounder sense of the distinctively feminine qualities and the peculiar womanly works and methods than Mary Lyon. On this point she was most explicit and emphatic in her teachings and

example. Wonderfully self-reliant, she was even more remarkably trustful in God. She had no difficulty in finding a sphere — not because of her capacity, but because of her spirit. She did "what she could." With half or with twice her abilities she would still have found something to do, — and that something, enough to fill her great heart.

It is refreshing to contemplate the life of a remarkable woman, who thoroughly realized both the Christian spirit of labor and the Christian standard of greatness. It is strengthening to commune, at this time, with a really great woman who never imbibed the distinctly heathen notion that greatness consists in station, prominence, publicity; that a person can have no "sphere" without a chance at the presidency, a senatorship, or at least a platform speech; a woman who spent no time in admiring her own genius, boasting of her pure womanly instincts, bewailing her oppressed condition, lamenting her want of opportunities, or abusing men, but whose humble faith and loving labors wrought results of blessing and blessedness as wide as the earth and as lasting as eternity. In the presence of such a woman the Catharines and Elizabeths, the De Staels and the Ossolis hide their diminished heads.

THE PRONUNCIATION OF GREEK.—The article in our May number on this subject, by Professor Seymour, attracted, as well it might, the attention of those capable of judging, — though, we believe, one editor found it "heavy." It was not only written "by the book," as some one remarked, but from personal communication with continental scholars. We expect, in due time, an article on the Pronunciation of Latin, from the same competent source.

THE TEMPERANCE QUESTION bids fair to assume new phases, theoretical and practical, which will force the advocates of temperance to consider well their position and duties. While many individuals and one national society are still laboring to show that all use of fermented liquors, even a sip of true wine religiously taken at the Lord's table, is disallowed in the Scriptures, the foreign population of Chicago are constraining the city government to repeal the prohibition of liquor-selling on Sunday — though fortunately the State law lies on the statute book — and so able a paper as the *Nation* openly argues against "prohibition," with arguments that *seem* to defend the practice of moderate drinking as the gratification of a natural and legitimate craving, attended with only the ordinary "risks of life."


Part of the fallacy of the argument fastens on the inaccurate word *prohibition* — whereas the real aim of such laws was and is only rigid restriction; part of it lies in an underestimate of the immense and needless calamities to *society* wrapped up in this individual vice; part of it in overlooking the claims which *society* — including not only and specially wives and children, but all that are taxed and liable to be outraged by its pauperism and crime — have to *protection* from the effects of a self-abuse, which also becomes abuse of others; part of it in forgetting those well-known principles of law which

restrain the practice of open and deliberate temptations upon the unwary, such as obscene books and the gambler's trade, and which abate nuisances.

We have no doubt that, as things are, the propriety of a rigid law of restriction on the sale of intoxicating drinks can be justified, and the Christian duty shown of refraining from the use of such drinks merely as a beverage. It becomes temperance men, however, to consider maturely their principles and arguments, and, casting away all that is questionable and unsound, to occupy ground that is defensible—*and to defend it.*

MASONIC CORNER-STONES.—The New York "Tribune" protests against the proposal to lay the corner-stone of the new capitol at Albany with Masonic ceremonies as improper. The objection comes with more weight from a journal which in the same article lauds the Masonic order with praises in which we can not sympathize. It is time that these unwarrantable intrusions ceased.

A VALUABLE UNITARIAN DISCOVERY.—"It is great folly," says the "Liberal Christian," "for the theists and free religionists of the Unitarian body to imagine that the more conservative men do not, some of them, know all that they know, and have not weighed all the arguments that have overturned their faith in a positive Christianity—without being upset by them." Well said. And the remark has a little wider application. There are a good many men in the orthodox ranks who have considered all the arguments, objections, difficulties, cavils of both these sets of men, without being disturbed by them. Many a Christian scholar has fully contemplated far more of the "difficulties" of his faith than the keenest of the skeptics, so that he could even teach him how to cavil, and rests all the more unshaken on God and His Word.

 It is, perhaps, needless to remark to our contributors that their articles must wait their turn. We have also book notices necessarily deferred.